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General Introduction 
 
 
Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.  
(Sun Tzu, The Art of War (490 B.C.))  
 
Capitalism, regardless of its advantages and disadvantages, relies on a significant 
pillar that is competitive markets. This economic system provides equal opportunities 
for all the potential players to enter the market, supply their products and services to 
the customers who passionate to maximize their utility. There, they may not be alone 
and should compete with some other rivals that have also found this market 
attractive. Nowadays it has transformed to a serious war, war of price, quality, 
quantity, innovation, wage and etc. Hence, firms must equip themselves with 
effective weapons, and one of the most significant tools is strategic thinking. Doing 
all the ordinary courses of business considering the analogous action and reaction of 
the competitors, and try to set its strategy based on this thinking model. Thus, firms’ 
strategy must be strategic. According to Michael Porter, strategy is making choices 
and trade-offs such as quantity choice, technology choice, capacity investment 
choice, R&D intensity choice and several other choices. The point is to consider that 
in the presence of competitors that are also strategic thinkers like us, rules of the 
competitive market determine the optimal amount of these choices and consequent 
profits. 
 
This dissertation contains of three independent papers which are approached to 
capture some strategic aspects in oligopoly with vertical structure. We focus on 
oligopolistic market structure in which few firms dominate. Firms are completely or 
partially aware of the actions of their rivals. Decisions of firms in this context affect, 
and are affected by decisions of other players.  Offering homogeneous final products 
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to the customers is the main assumption in our models. Cell phone, Film, Gas, Steel 
and several other examples can be mentioned as actual oligopolistic industries. To 
model our oligopolistic markets we choose Cournot, the model which assumes that 
there are two equally positioned firms; the firms compete on the basis of quantity 
rather than price and each firm makes an output decision assuming that the other 
firm’s behavior is fixed. (Kreps, 1990) 
 
To model demand, we employ linear inverse demand function. This demand model 
represents a consumer choice in which he maximizes a quadratic, strictly concave 
utility function. In chapter 2 and 3 our market characterized by demand uncertainty, 
that is occurs in the intercepts of the inverse demand function. In chapter 1, we face 
with deterministic demand. Game theoretic (static or dynamic – with complete or 
incomplete information) models are applied to formally plot the sequence of events in 
each essay. Incentives of players in each model are tried to capture interesting 
topics of industrial organization, from R&D, knowledge spillover and firm location in 
chapter 1 to capacity investment decision and technology choice of firms in chapter 2 
and finally, information sharing and quantity ordering choice of corporations in 
chapter 3. All the players are assumed to be risk-neutral and try to maximize their 
own profit. 
 
The paper “The Effect of Vertical Knowledge Spillovers via the Supply Chain on 
Location Decision of Firms” which will be discussed in chapter 1 was published in the 
special issue of Journal of Business and Policy Research, April 2012 (JBPR, Vol. 7, 
No. 1). In this research a three-stage game of complete information is employed to 
model the incentives of two producers and two suppliers of two vertically-structured 
supply chains considering two different geographical regions, to investigate how the 
location decision of a producer is influenced by the location patterns of suppliers in 
the presence of vertical and horizontal knowledge spillovers. Strategic location 
choice of a producer between geographical concentration and isolation in equilibrium 
is the main interest of this essay. Numerical analysis expresses that both scenario 
(concentration and isolation) is possible depending on the range of model’s 
parameters. Moreover, the impact of different technological level of players on 
strategic location decisions will be explained. 
 
 
3 Three Essays on Strategic Aspects in Oligopoly with Vertical Structure 
In chapter 2 the paper “The Effect of Salvage Market on Strategic Technology 
Choice and Capacity Investment Decision of Firm under Demand Uncertainty” is 
forthcoming in the Journal of Business Economics and Management in 2012. In this 
essay a multi-stage game with complete information is applied to model three 
strategic decisions of two competing producers in the presence of a secondary 
market (we call it salvage market). Technology choice (flexible and inflexible), 
capacity investment choice (general, specific and unified components) and quantity 
choice (Cournot competition) are three games which will be sequentially played by 
producers. Primary market of the model is characterized with demand uncertainty. 
Indeed this chapter deals with the choice of the flexibility of the production process of 
an oligopolistic producer facing uncertain demand. The trade-off studied is one 
between a flexible production process involving the production of generally usable 
components which are assembled after the size of the demand is known, and a less 
flexible but less costly production process, where specific products are produced and 
put on stock. The new feature of the paper compared to the literature is that the 
strategic effects on competitors in the market of these two choices are taken into 
account in the analysis. 
 
The paper “Supply Chain Configuration under Information Sharing” in chapter 3 is 
submitted to the Journal of Business Economics and Management. A dynamic multi-
stage game with incomplete information (a signaling game) is employed to 
analytically model the incentives of firm’s to acquire, share and leak demand 
information, and their impact on order quantities and the configuration of supply 
chain(s). Private information about market demand is the source of asymmetry 
between two producers (the incumbent and the entrant), which could be leaked via a 
common supplier. Trade-off between operation management and information 
management defines the potential interaction of the players which could result in 
different supply chain scheme.   
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Chapter 1 
 
Firm Location and  
Knowledge Spillovers 
 
 
 
n this essay a game theoretic model is employed to analyze the 
relationship between strategic location decision of firms in the supply 
chain considering the role of horizontal and vertical knowledge 
spillovers, and numerical approach is applied to characterize the 
equilibria of the considered multi-stage game. Geographical 
concentration or isolation as equilibrium outcome is determined based 
on our different parameterizations and two scenarios each consists of 
two separated cases, which we establish according to the location of 
our agents. In the first scenario both suppliers are supposed to be 
located in different regions while in the second one they act in a same 
region. In addition, first case of each scenario considers geographical 
isolation of two producers whereas second case investigates the 
geographical concentration. Furthermore, the effect of different 
technological level of our agents on their final location decision is 
investigated.  
 
 
 
I 
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1. Introduction  
 
“Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than 
distant things.” (Waldo Tobler) The importance of location decision of firms and its 
consequent effect on knowledge spillovers and innovation intensity of even whole 
industry has been emphasized in recent studies. “Innovation has become the 
defining challenge of global competitiveness; to manage it well, companies must 
harness the power of location in creating and commercializing new ideas”. (Porter 
and Stern, 2001, pp. 28) Clusters as geographical concentration of interconnected 
companies and institutions in a particular filed (See Porter 1998), is an interesting 
concept appears in economic geography and innovation literature. “What happens 
inside companies is important, but clusters reveal that the immediate business 
environment outside companies plays a vital role as well. This role of location has 
been long overlooked, despite striking evidence that innovation and competitive 
success in so many fields are geographically concentrated – whether it’s 
entertainment in Hollywood, finance on Wall Street or consumer electronics in 
Japan”. (Porter, 1998, pp. 78)  
 
Furthermore recent empirical evidence shows that cost considerations have obtained 
significant attention relative to market entry and are concerned recently in many 
cases the main factor affecting firms’ location decisions. (See Kinkel and Lay, 2004) 
Beside factor costs and entry into new markets, some other relevant arguments 
including availability of skilled labor, the local institutional environment, the size or 
economic importance of a region in relation to the expected intensity of competition 
or the possibility to improve production due to technological spillovers from other 
firms or research institute in the local proximity can affect the location decision of 
firms.  
 
In this chapter a different viewpoint to location decision of firms in the presence of 
knowledge spillovers is applied. Actually strategic location decision of producers with 
respect to technological activities of their respected suppliers in a framework of 
supply chain is examined, which has been studied rarely in literatures. (See Ishii, 
2004) Indeed the role of vertical knowledge spillovers between producer and supplier 
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via supply chain is highlighted and distinguished from horizontal knowledge 
spillovers which occur between two firms from same stream of a market. Here we 
are eager to respond the question that under which circumstances vertical 
knowledge spillovers via supply chain lead to geographical concentration.  
 
In this research we try to bind economic geography concepts like isolation or 
concentration of firms with knowledge spillover context which has origin in R&D 
literatures which has not done independently and numerically in previous literature. 
For this purpose a three-stage game theoretic model is established as in the first 
stage, our economic agents including two suppliers and their respected producers 
locate in two geographically different regions based on the framework of our model, 
then in the second stage they invest on R&D activities in the form of marginal cost 
reduction and finally in the third stage they compete on the amount of output they will 
produce strategically via Cournot market structure.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Several studies have been done so far in the appreciation of geographical 
concentration e.g. Krugman (1991) has mentioned three reasons for localization: 
first, the concentration of several firms in a single location offers a pooled market for 
workers with industry-specific skills, ensuring both a lower probability of 
unemployment and a lower probability of labor shortage; Second, localized industries 
can support the production of no tradable specialized inputs and third informational 
spillovers can give clustered firms a better production function than isolated 
producers. 
 
Almazan, De Motta and Titman (2007) introduced a model which exhibits that the 
choice of locating within rather than away from industry clusters is influenced by the 
extent to which training costs are borne by firm versus employees. Moreover, the 
uncertainty about future productivity shocks and the ability of firms to modify the 
scale of their operations also influence location choice. 
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Moreover, several economists have investigated different aspects of investment on 
R&D activities e.g. Poyago-Theotoky (1991) established her static game theoretic 
model based on empirical evidence that the number of cooperative agreements in 
R&D has increased since 1980s. In her viewpoint R&D cooperation not only leads 
firm to engage in more R&D and thus produce more R&D output (in the form of cost 
reduction) but, in addition, has also the beneficial effect of making firms fully disclose 
their information. This kind of R&D cooperation is seen to improve own firm 
profitability and social welfare as it involves lower prices and higher total output 
relative to non-cooperation. She considered knowledge spillovers endogenously in 
her model. 
 
Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003) endogenized technological spillovers with a new 
approach via static game theoretic model  in which firms compete for knowledge by 
making wage offers to each other’s R&D employees. They showed that incentives to 
acquire spillovers and incentives to prevent spillovers are stronger under quantity 
competition than under price competition.  
 
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) investigated the effect of cooperation level of 
firms on social welfare considering duopoly market in the presence of knowledge 
spillovers. They considered two types of agreements in which in the first one 
companies share basic information and efforts in the R&D stage but remain rival in 
the marketplace while in the second case, extended collusion between partners, 
creating common policies at the product level.  
 
Dawid and Wersching (2007) showed that because of competition effects, 
technological spillovers as a technological coordination device negatively affect the 
profits of cluster firms. Moreover Dawid, Greiner and Zou (2010) established a 
dynamic model of a firm which is deciding whether to outsource parts of its 
production to a less developed economy where wages and the level of technology 
are lower. Outsourcing reduces production costs but is associated with spillovers to 
foreign potential competitors which increase productivity of those firms over time and 
make them stronger competitor on the common market. 
Considering all above mentioned outstanding studies in this filed, this paper focuses 
on the effects of vertical knowledge spillover between a supplier and its respected 
 
8 Three Essays on Strategic Aspects in Oligopoly with Vertical Structure 
producer -which may appear in the form of some R&D cooperation agreements in 
order to eliminate duplication of R&D efforts- plus horizontal knowledge spillover 
between two firms of the same stream of the market -which compete with each other 
in the same marketplace- on the location decision of these agents which may result 
geographical concentration or isolation. It is often pointed out in the literature that the 
close relationships between final-good producer and its respected supplier are 
important for successful innovation efforts. (See von Hippel 1988; Riggs and von 
Hippel, 1994) 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, theoretical model and 
methodology is presented which will be analyzed in section 3 utilizing numerical 
approach. The last section concludes and points out possible extensions of the 
model as well as research limitations. 
 
3. Model and Methodology 
 
Consider an economy including two separated geographical regions iR , 1,2i =  but 
treated as one market. Four firms consisting of two suppliers and two producers from 
the same industry collaborate via their supply chain in the form that iS  is a supplier 
of just iP  with 1,2i = . Without loss of generality we assume that upstream suppliers 
iS ( 1,2i = ) produce homogeneous intermediate goods and downstream producers      
iP ( 1,2i = ) produce homogeneous final goods respectively which one unit of 
intermediate good is required to produce exactly one unit of final good. We 
investigate two scenarios which in the first one both suppliers are located in the 
same region, say 1R , and in the other one suppliers act in different regions.  
 
We utilize a three-stage static game with perfect information: In the first stage, firms 
locate in two regions iR  ( 1,2i = ) based on our abovementioned scenarios about 
suppliers; in the second stage, firms choose their cost-reducing R&D expenditure 
(Innovation level) iX  for producers and iY  for suppliers ( 1,2i = ); in the third stage 
vertical and horizontal knowledge spillovers exogenously take place given the 
formation of firms in two regions as well as their innovation efforts and firms compete 
 
9 Three Essays on Strategic Aspects in Oligopoly with Vertical Structure 
on standard Cournot market structure to choose the amount of output they will 
produce strategically. 
 
Figure 1: Sequence of Events 
 
 
 
                t=1                                                                  t=2                                                            t=3 
         Firms Locate                                                  Firms choose                                             Firms Play  
                                                                        Their Innovation Level                           Standard Cournot Game 
                                                                            
We define here vertical knowledge spillovers as knowledge spillovers between two 
firms of different stream (Supplier and Producer) via supply chain and can occur 
between two firms located in the same region rβ  or between two firms of different 
regions tβ  , but we assume that regional vertical knowledge spillovers are stronger 
than the trans-regional vertical one, so r tβ β> . These exogenous parameters show 
the proportion of innovation efforts of a firm which might be absorbed by 
counterparty. Horizontal knowledge spillovers imply spillovers between two firms of a 
same stream (Two producers or two suppliers) and can happen only when both are 
located in the same region. We denote it with exogenous parameters pγ for 
producers and sγ for suppliers ( p sγ γ γ= =   if exist). Moreover we assume that 
horizontal knowledge spillovers if exist are stronger than vertical one of both types 
since both producers act as same level firms in the same market, 
0 1p st rβ β γ γ γ≤ < < = = ≤   (If pγ , sγ or both exists). In this setting zero implies 
occurrence of no spillover and one implies perfect spillovers. Indeed the external 
effect of firm i ’s innovation effort is to decrease firm j ’s unit production cost. 
 
Linear inverse demand function is utilized given by P a bQ= −  ( 1 2Q q q= + ) and 
/ 0a b > shows the size of the market.  /Q a b< , 0b > . The inverse demand function 
is useful in deriving the total and marginal revenue functions. Total revenue equals 
price P times quantityQ or * ( )*TR P Q a bQ Q= = − . The marginal revenue function is 
the first derivative of the total revenue function with respect to Q , that is
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2MR a bQ= − . The importance of being able to simply calculate MR  is that the profit-
maximizing condition for firms regardless of market structure is to produce where 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost MC , that is MR MC= . 
 
Our producers as well as our suppliers are supposed to have similar constant unit 
cost of transforming   intermediate goods ,P SC C respectively. By innovation efforts in 
second stage, their unit cost of production is reduced by iX  for producers and iY  for 
suppliers. ( 1,2i = )  
 
We assume that intermediate goods are sold by suppliers to producers with constant 
price P , e.g. based on some long-term contractual commitments. 0 PC P a< + <  
 
Therefore, unit cost of production is of the form pPi i i i jC C X Y X Pβ γ= − − − + such that
{i iir it iif S and P arein sameregionif S and P arein different regionsβββ = , { 11 220p
p if P and P are in same region
if P and P are in different regions
γγ =   and
{ 11 220
s
s if S and S are in same region
if S and S are in different regions
γγ =  .        ( , 1, 2i j =   ; p Pi i i jX Y X P Cβ γ+ + − ≤ ) 
 
Following Qiu (1997), we assume that innovation costs are of the quadratic form
2( ) ( )
ii P i
K X v X= , 0
iP
v >  for producers and 2( ) ( )
ii S i
K Y v Y= , 0
iS
v > for suppliers 
respectively ( 1,2i = ) which implies diminishing returns in R&D. 
Profit function of the producing firms 1,2i =  will have the form of  
( ) ( ) 2( )i ip Pi Ppi i i i j i iva bQ q C X Y X q XPπ β γ += − − − − − −  and for suppliers we have
( ) 2( )i is Si i i Ssi j i i iP vq C Y Y X q Yπ γ β= − − − − − . 
 
Methodology: Whereas solving final equation systems involves sophisticated 
parametric calculations which make the comparison of final payoff functions almost 
impossible, numerical approach is applied afterwards. Mathematica will be employed 
to depict us the role of each parameter of our model as well as the sensitivity of 
these results upon parametrical changes. 
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We categorize our parameters into three groups including 1. Market parameters:
, , ,a b P C     2. Knowledge spillovers parameter: , ,r tβ β γ  and 3. Innovation cost 
parameter:ν  
For the purpose of simplicity we establish three assumptions which we release some 
of them completely or partially afterwards: 
Assumption 1: At the first stage of the game -which firms locate- our first producer 
(P1), first supplier (S1) and second supplier (S2) has chosen their location 
exogenously based on the framework of our model in section 3; So we are supposed 
to investigate the location decision of our second producer (P2) in order to answer 
our research question upon geographical concentration. 
Assumption 2: All parameters are considered to be correspondingly homogeneous. 
Later we release this assumption with respect to innovation’s cost parameterν . 
Assumptions 3: Innovation’s cost of our producers is assumed to be infinity so they 
will not invest on any innovation effort: 0jkPiX = for , , 1, 2i j k = . We will relax this 
assumption completely afterwards.  
 
4. Analysis and Findings 
 
In this chapter we analyze our model based on two scenarios which we have 
established on our model regarding the location decision of suppliers. Throughout 
we are going to find out the location decision of our producers and the postulated 
equilibrium. In fact we want to answer this question that under which circumstances 
knowledge spillovers via supply chain lead us to geographical concentration. 
Backward induction will be applied to find the SPE of our three-stage static game 
with perfect information. In each scenario, payoff function of both producers in two 
different cases will be analyzed parametrically; in the first case of each scenario we 
assume that both producers are located in different regions while in the second case 
geographical concentration of producers will be compared.   
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4.1. First Scenario: Two Suppliers are Located in Different Regions 
In this scenario we assume that our suppliers have decided to locate in different 
regions, say R1 and R2. Consequently based on our model horizontal knowledge 
spillover between them will not appear in our calculations. 
 
4.1.1. Case 1: Two Producers are Located in Different Regions     
 
 
 
   
 
 
At t=3 producers play a standard Cournot duopoly game with the following payoff 
functions: 
( )211 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 111 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )P P P P P P r S P P Pa bq bq q C X Y P q Xπ β ν= − − − − − + −  
( )211 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 112 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( )P P P P P P r S P P Pa bq bq q C X Y P q Xπ β ν= − − − − − + −  
In this notation 111Pπ  is the payoff function of the first producer in the first scenario as 
well as the first case respectively, for example 122Pπ  shows the payoff of the second 
producer in the second case of the first scenario. 
Finding out the optimal value of these payoff functions lead us to solving the 
following maximization problem: 
11
1
11
1max
P
P
q
π for the first producer and 
11
2
11
2max
P
P
q
π  for the second one. 
By F.O.C. we have:  
S1 S2 
P1 P2 
R1 R2 
rβ  rβ
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11
1
11
1
0P
Pq
π∂
=
∂
    and       
11
2
11
2
0P
Pq
π∂
=
∂  
Nash-Cournot quantities produced by both producers will be reached after some 
simple calculations, 
11 11 11 11
11 1 2 1 2
1
(2 ) 2
3
P r S S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X Pq
b
β− + − + − −
=
   
11 11 11 11
11 2 1 2 1
2
(2 ) 2
3
P r S S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X Pq
b
β− + − + − −
=
 
Consequently optimal payoffs of our producers are: 
( )
11 11 11 11 2 211 11 112 1 2 1
1 1 1
[ (2 ) 2 ]
9
P r S S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P X
b
β
π ν∗
− + − + − −
= −  
( )
11 11 11 11 2 211 11 111 2 1 2
2 2 2
[ (2 ) 2 ]
9
P r S S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P X
b
β
π ν∗
− + − + − −
= −  
At t=2 firms decide on their innovation level 11PiX  and 
11
SjY as well. ( , 1, 2)i j =  Payoff 
functions of suppliers are as follow: 
( )211 11 11 11 11 11 111 1 1 1 1 1 1. ( )S NC S S r P NC S SP q C Y X q Yπ β ν= − − − −
 
( )211 11 11 11 11 11 112 2 2 2 2 2 2. ( )S NC S S r P NC S SP q C Y X q Yπ β ν= − − − −
 
Optimal innovation level of each firm arises from solving four maximization problems 
strategically as one system; indeed each one is going to maximize its payoff function  
as follow:
11
1
11
2
11
1
11
2
11
1
11
2
11
1
11
2
max
max
max
max
P
P
S
S
P
X
P
X
S
Y
S
Y
π
π
π
π
∗
∗











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Subject to four following constraints respectively: 
11 11
1 1
11 11
2 2
11 11
1 1
11 11
2 2
0
0
0
0
P P r S
P P r S
S S r P
S S r P
C X Y P a
C X Y P a
C Y X P
C Y X P
β
β
β
β
 ≤ − − + ≤

≤ − − + ≤

≤ − − ≤
 ≤ − − ≤
 
 
4.1.2. Case 2: Two Producers are Located in Same Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Geographical concentration of producers will be investigated by this case. Similarly, 
at t=3 producers play a standard Cournot duopoly game with the following payoff 
functions: 
( )212 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 121 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1( ) ( )P P P P P P r S P P P Pa bq bq q C X Y X P q Xπ β γ ν= − − − − − − + −  
( )212 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 122 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2( ) ( )P P P P P P r S P P P Pa bq bq q C X Y X P q Xπ β γ ν= − − − − − − + −  
Maximization of these two payoff functions with respect to relevant quantities as we 
did in previous case give us Nash-Cournot quantities as follow: 
12 12 12 12
12 1 2 1 2
1
2 2 (1 )
3
P r S t S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X Pq
b
β β γ− + − + − − −
=  
12 12 12 12
12 2 1 2 1
2
2 2 (1 )
3
P r S t S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X Pq
b
β β γ− + − + − − −
=  
S1 S2 
P1 P2 
R1 R2 
rβ  
tβ
 
γ  
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Thus optimal values of our producers’ payoff functions are as below: 
( )
12 12 12 12 2 212 12 121 2 1 2
1 1 1
[ 2 2 (1 ) ]
9
P r S t S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P X
b
β β γ
π ν∗
− + − + − − −
= −  
( )
12 12 12 12 2 212 12 122 1 2 1
2 2 2
[ 2 2 (1 ) ]
9
P r S t S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P X
b
β β γ
π ν∗
− + − + − − −
= −  
Similarly proceeding backward, at t=2 firms decide on their optimal innovation level 
12
PiX  and 
12
SjY as well. ( , 1, 2)i j =  Payoff functions of suppliers are as follow: 
( )
( )
212 12 12 12 12 12 12
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
212 12 12 12 12 12 12
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
. ( )
. ( )
S NC S S r P NC S S
S NC S S t P NC S S
P q C Y X q Y
P q C Y X q Y
π β ν
π β ν
= − − − −
= − − − −  
Optimal innovation level of each firm arises from solving four maximization problems 
strategically as one system; indeed each one is going to maximize its payoff function 
as follow: 
12
1
12
2
12
1
12
2
12
1
12
2
12
1
12
2
max
max
max
max
P
P
S
S
P
X
P
X
S
Y
S
Y
π
π
π
π
∗
∗











 
With respect to the following four constraints respectively:
 
12 12 12
1 1 2
12 12 12
2 2 1
12 12
1 1
12 12
2 2
0
0
0
0
P P r S P
P P r S P
S S r P
S S r P
C X Y X P a
C X Y X P a
C Y X P
C Y X P
β γ
β γ
β
β
 ≤ − − − + ≤

≤ − − − + ≤

≤ − − ≤
 ≤ − − ≤
 
 
4.2. Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are Located in Same Region 
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Contrary to the first scenario, in the second one whereas our suppliers are located in 
the same region, say R1, horizontal knowledge spillover between them emerges in 
both respective cases depicted with parameterγ .  
4.2.1. Case 1: Two Producers are Located in Different Regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applying backward induction, at t=3 producers play a standard Cournot duopoly 
game with the following payoff functions: 
( )221 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 211 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )P P P P P P r S P P Pa bq bq q C X Y P q Xπ β ν= − − − − − + −  
( )221 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 212 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( )P P P P P P t S P P Pa bq bq q C X Y P q Xπ β ν= − − − − − + −  
Nash-Cournot quantities are the result of maximization process over these payoff 
functions with respect to 21 211 2&P Pq q   respectively: 
21 21 21 21
21 1 2 1 2
1
2 2
3
P r S t S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X Pq
b
β β− + − + − −
=  
21 21 21 21
21 2 1 2 1
2
2 2
3
P t S r S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X Pq
b
β β− + − + − −
=  
After plugging these optimal quantities into payoff functions of producers, following 
optimal values of them arise: 
( )
21 21 21 21 2 221 21 211 2 1 2
1 1 1
[ 2 2 ]
9
P r S t S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P X
b
β β
π ν∗
− + − + − −
= −  
tβ
 
S1 S2 
P1 P2 
R1 R2 
rβ  
γ  
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( )
21 21 21 21 2 221 21 212 1 2 1
2 2 2
[ 2 2 ]
9
P t S r S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P X
b
β β
π ν∗
− + − + − −
= −  
Proceeding backward, at t=2 firms decide upon their innovation level 21PiX  and 
21
SjY as 
well. ( , 1, 2)i j =  Profit functions of our suppliers are as follow: 
( )
( )
221 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
221 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
. ( )
. ( )
S NC S S r P S NC S S
S NC S S t P S NC S S
P q C Y X Y q Y
P q C Y X Y q Y
π β γ ν
π β γ ν
= − − − − −
= − − − − −
 
Optimal innovation level of each firm will deduce from maximization of their 
respective payoff functions strategically as a four-equations-four-unknowns system: 
21
1
21
2
21
1
21
2
21
1
21
2
21
1
21
2
max
max
max
max
P
P
S
S
P
X
P
X
S
Y
S
Y
π
π
π
π
∗
∗











 
With respect to the following four constraints respectively: 
21 21
1 1
21 21
2 2
21 21 21
1 1 2
21 21 21
2 2 1
0
0
0
0
P P r S
P P t S
S S r P S
S S t P S
C X Y P a
C X Y P a
C Y X Y P
C Y X Y P
β
β
β γ
β γ
 ≤ − − + ≤

≤ − − + ≤

≤ − − − ≤
 ≤ − − − ≤
 
4.2.2. Case 2: Two Producers are Located in Same Region 
 
 
 
 
 
γ  
S1 S2 
P1 P2 
R1 R2 
rβ  rβ  
γ  
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Geographical concentration of producers in the second scenario will be investigated 
via this case. Incidentally horizontal knowledge spillovers between two producers as 
well as two suppliers exist in this case which induce flow of knowledge through our 
four firms depicted by parameters ,rβ γ . 
By using backward induction, at t=3 producers play a standard Cournot duopoly 
game with the below mention payoff functions: 
( )
( )
222 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
222 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
P P P P P P r S P P P P
P P P P P P r S P P P P
a bq bq q C X Y X P q X
a bq bq q C X Y X P q X
π β γ ν
π β γ ν
= − − − − − − + −
= − − − − − − + −
 
By solving First-Order-Condition equations of both producers as a one system, 
maximum Nash-Cournot value of our quantities have the following form: 
22 22 22 22
22 1 2 1 2
1
22 22 22 22
22 2 1 2 1
2
2 2 (1 )
3
2 2 (1 )
3
P r S r S P P
NC
P r S r S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X Pq
b
a C Y Y X X Pq
b
β β γ
β β γ
− + − + − − −
=
− + − + − − −
=
  
Consequently optimal payoff functions of our producers are as follow: 
( )
( )
22 22 22 22 2 222 22 221 2 1 2
1 1 1
22 22 22 22 2 222 22 222 1 2 1
2 2 2
[ 2 2 (1 ) ]
9
[ 2 2 (1 ) ]
9
P r S r S P P
P P P
P r S r S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P X
b
a C Y Y X X P X
b
β β γ
π ν
β β γ
π ν
∗
∗
− + − + − − −
= −
− + − + − − −
= −
 
Proceeding backward, at t=2 firms decide on their innovation level 22PiX  and 
22
SjY as 
well. ( , 1, 2)i j =  Payoff functions of suppliers are as follow: 
( )
( )
222 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
222 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
. ( )
. ( )
S NC S S r P S NC S S
S NC S S r P S NC S S
P q C Y X Y q Y
P q C Y X Y q Y
π β γ ν
π β γ ν
= − − − − −
= − − − − −
 
Similar to our previous cases, optimal level of innovation of our firms will be resulted 
by strategically solving a four-equations-four-unknowns system of equations as 
follow: 
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22
1
22
2
22
1
22
2
22
1
22
2
22
1
22
2
max
max
max
max
P
P
S
S
P
X
P
X
S
Y
S
Y
π
π
π
π
∗
∗











    
Providing the satisfaction of the four below mention constraints respectively: 
22 22 22
1 1 2
22 22 22
2 2 1
22 22 22
1 1 2
22 22 22
2 2 1
0
0
0
0
P P r S P
P P r S P
S S r P S
S S r P S
C X Y X P a
C X Y X P a
C Y X Y P
C Y X Y P
β γ
β γ
β γ
β γ
 ≤ − − − + ≤

≤ − − − + ≤

≤ − − − ≤
 ≤ − − − ≤
 
 
4.3. Findings 
 
4.3.1. Producers Do NOT Invest on any Innovation Effort 
In the first phase of our analysis for the purpose of simplicity and based on 
assumption 3, we ignore any innovation effort of our both producers. Obviously with 
this assumption in hand horizontal knowledge spillovers between producers will not 
occur. We will relax this assumption for broader analysis later.  
Observation 1: In the first scenario and in the absence of innovation efforts of both 
producers, the first case which shows the geographical isolation is the equilibrium. 
As we have established in the first scenario both suppliers are located in different 
regions and consequently there is no horizontal knowledge spillover between them. 
As a result the only channel of innovation’s disclosure is through vertical knowledge 
spillovers characterized by parameters &r tβ β which 0 1t rβ β≤ < ≤ . Comparison 
between two cases of this scenario shows us that the second producer will find it 
more profitable locating itself in the different region in order to obtain innovation effort 
of its respective supplier via regional -rather than trans regional- vertical knowledge 
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spillover which will decline its costs more. Obviously the fist producer will prefer the 
second case over the first one. Because he will compete with a producer who could 
reduce his costs with the factor t rβ β< , but it is not equilibrium while second 
producer will tend to deviate to the first case and locate in different region. 
More precisely speaking, we can consider following graphs showed in figure 4.3.1.1 
which help us to compare the payoffs of producers in these cases. As depicted in 
this set of graphs, the first producer clearly prefers the occurrence of second case in 
which he will obtain more profit from the market while the second producers 
dominantly prefers the first case getting more payoffs. Suppliers have the same 
behavior symmetrically. 
Observation 2: In the second scenario and in the absence of innovation efforts of 
both producers, the second case which shows the geographical concentration is the 
equilibrium. 
In this scenario horizontal knowledge spillovers between two suppliers which is 
characterized byγ , exist. Similar to the interpretation of the previous observation, in 
this scenario our second producer dominantly prefers geographical concentration 
which depicted in the second case. Consequently he is able to reduce his costs 
based on the knowledge spillovers factor r tβ β> which will not be in the favor of first 
producer who prefers to be alone in the first region as depicted in the first case. But 
based on assumption 1 second case of this scenario would be the equilibrium. 
Although locating of both suppliers is exogenous, their behavior can be interpreted 
similarly. On the other hand first producer prefers first case in which his competitor is 
able to share his knowledge with second supplier via trans-regional vertical 
knowledge spillover that is smaller than regional one. 
Figure 4.3.1.2 exhibits the comparison of payoffs of our economic agents in two 
different cases of this scenario which support above mentioned reasoning.  
When R&D efforts of both producers were ignored as we did in this subsection, our 
observations show strong robustness upon parametrical changes. Broad ranges of 
parameters have been checked numerically in this part in order to guarantee the final 
results.  
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Figure 2  
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions (Yellow: Case1 & Red: Case2) 
                                            
1 2 1
( 100, 2, 0.05, 0.2, 0.7)t P P Sa b β γ ν ν ν= = = = = = =  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3  
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region (Green: Case1 & Blue: Case2) 
                                            
1 2 1
( 100, 2, 0.05, 0.2, 0.7)t P P Sa b β γ ν ν ν= = = = = = =  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 Three Essays on Strategic Aspects in Oligopoly with Vertical Structure 
4.3.2. Producers Enter Innovation Efforts 
In this section we relax assumption 3 and consider the innovation efforts of both 
producers in our analysis. Obviously in this situation horizontal knowledge spillovers 
between two producers which characterized by γ  will play an important role affecting 
final outcomes. Furthermore based on assumption 2, horizontal knowledge spillovers 
between two suppliers as well as two producers are assumed to be homogeneous, 
that is suppliers producersγ γ γ= = . 
In the previous section 4.3.1 the results were completely robust with respect to 
postulated parameters which categorized in section 3 and no deviation from our 
mentioned equilibrium occurred during numerical analysis and parametric changes, 
but in this section we examine the robustness and sustainability of our observations 
according to categorization of our parameters.  
Observation 3: In the first scenario and in the presence of innovation efforts of both 
producers, the second case which shows the geographical concentration is the 
equilibrium. 
Observation 4: In the second scenario and in the presence of innovation efforts of 
both producers, the second case which shows the geographical concentration is the 
equilibrium. 
 
4.3.2.1. Comparative Static 
In order to realize the effect of each parameter on our outcomes, and supporting the 
robustness of observations 3 and 4, we investigate comparative static in this 
subsection. For this purpose two sets of parameters –based on our categorization in 
section 3- are being fixed and the parametrical effects of the third set are being 
analyzed. Broad ranges of parameters have been checked in order to ensure us 
about robustness of our observation upon parametrical changes, but some limited 
examples could be mentioned here.  
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4.3.2.1.1. Market Parameters 
Providing other parameters are supposed to be fixed, we investigate the effect of our 
market parameters which characterized by , , ,a b P C on equilibria and location 
decision of our agents. Utilizing numerical approach we consider the impact of 
altering the market parameters on equilibrium expressed in observations 3 and 4.  
In the first scenario as depicted in figures 4 and 5 second producer prefers second 
case over the first one implying geographical concentration. Altering the size of the 
market as well as the unit cost of production and price does not affect the location 
decision of our producers.  
Altering the size of the market indeed just affect the profit value of agents 
proportionally and has not any effect on location decision of them. Actually paying 
attention to ‘Markup’ index of agents in this model clarifies this matter more. In fact 
any reduction in the size of the market will decline the quantity produced by our 
agents which cause them to decrease innovation efforts in order to reach marginal 
profits in the market. Contrary is valid when market size goes up, but whereas our 
agents doing business in the same market, these changes affect all proportionally.  
Similar interpretations could be applied for the second scenario in which all agents 
dominantly prefer clustering structure over the first case. Figures 6 and 7 confirm our 
claim.  
Comprehensive parametric analysis has been done in this subsection to ensure us 
upon robustness of observations including broad range of reservation price, market 
size, unit cost of transforming intermediate goods C  and different value of 
intermediate good’s price P . 
 
4.3.2.1.2. Knowledge Spillover Parameters 
For the sake of more accurate analysis we arrange a relation between knowledge 
spillover parameters based on the framework of our model, in which we have 
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assumed that 0 1t rβ β γ≤ < < ≤ . Hence we suppose that r tβ αβ δγ= = such that 
1α > and0 1δ< < . 
In the first scenario second producer would be able to decline its costs from two 
source of knowledge, its relevant supplier in the different region as well as the first 
producer in the same region with knowledge spillover factors tβ andγ respectively. 
Numerical analysis shows that the effect of these two factors is more than the effect 
of regional vertical knowledge spillover factor rβ alone. Figures 8, 9 and 10 exhibit 
the different selection of knowledge spillover parameters subject to holding the other 
parameters fixed. Moreover as depicted in these figures the first producer also 
prefers second case over the first one which demonstrate his tendency to 
geographical concentration in which he is able to obtain knowledge from two sources 
with the factors rβ andγ while his competitor will lose some customers of the 
common market because of higher costs of production. Thus although the second 
producer will obtain lower payoff than his competitor he will locate himself near him 
in order to exploit his innovation efforts which would create better outcome for both 
of them. 
The behavior of our suppliers is a little bit more interesting. The first supplier 
dominantly prefers the second case over the first one in which he will always have 
competitive advantage over his rival. He obtains cost-reducing knowledge with two 
factors rβ andγ while his competitor just can do it via tβ andγ . Our respected figures 
depict that clearly, but in figure 10 where we have no explicit difference between 
knowledge spillover parameters , ,r tβ β γ the second producer will also reach more 
profit in the second case. Consequently our second supplier prefers the symmetric 
structure of first case when the amount of our knowledge spillover factors is 
meaningfully different.     
In the second scenario all of our agents do agree to compete and collaborate with 
each other in a cluster, so geographical concentration would be dominantly preferred 
by them. If second producer chooses the isolated region, directly he could be able 
just to obtain the knowledge via his relevant supplier with the parameter tβ . 
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Moreover he will lose the chance to exchange his knowledge with his competitor in 
the market. When second producer were a stronger innovative firm in the market 
with higher technology level, this kind of isolation decision might mean more, but in 
this section based on assumption 2 we have assumed that innovation costs is similar 
between all agents. We will relax this assumption later. This equilibrium shows 
strong robustness upon changing the parameters.  
 
4.3.2.1.3. Innovation Cost Parameter 
The last group of parameter which we are going to analyze is innovation cost 
characterized by ν  and assumed to be homogenous. We will investigate the 
heterogeneity of this parameter which means different technological level between 
our agents in the next section. 
Following Qiu (1997) we have assumed that innovation cost are of the form
2( ) ( )jk jkPi PiK X v X= , 0v > and , , 1, 2i j k =  for producers as well as
2( ) ( )jk jkSi SiK Y v Y= , 
0v > and , , 1, 2i j k = for suppliers which implies diminishing returns in R&D.  
Figure 14 depicts that in the first scenario if innovation cost is altered homogenously 
second producer prefers geographical concentration over isolation which is also a 
preferred situation for the first producer and supplier and our second supplier is 
somewhat indifferent between two cases.  
Providing innovation cost assumed to be homogenous, any increase in this cost 
enforces our agents to decline R&D efforts which decline their final profit 
proportionally, but does not affect location decision of them. Inversely high 
technological firms with lower level of innovation cost will do more R&D activities 
which decline their total costs and consequently increase the final payoff.  
Similarly as depicted in figure 15 in the second scenario all agents prefer to compete 
and collaborate with each other in the same geographical region. 
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Figure 4 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with a=100, b=2 (Green: Case1 & Red: Case2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with a=40, b=2 (Black: Case1 & Blue: Case2) 
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Figure 6 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with a=100, b=2 (Green: Case1 & Red: Case2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with a=40, b=2 (Black: Case1 & Blue: Case2) 
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Figure 8 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with 2, 0.5α δ= =  (Green: Case1 & Red: Case2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with 1.1, 0.9α δ= =  (Black: Case1 & Blue: Case2) 
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Figure 10 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with 5, 0.33α δ= =  (Orange: Case1 & Black: Case2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with 2, 0.5α δ= =  (Green: Case1 & Red: Case2) 
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Figure 12 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with 1.1, 0.9α δ= =  (Black: Case1 & Blue: Case2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with 5, 0.33α δ= =  (Orange: Case1 & Black: Case2) 
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Figure 14 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions (Green: Case1 & Red: Case2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region (Green: Case1 & Red: Case2) 
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4.3.3. Heterogeneity of Innovation Cost 
So far we assumed that technological level of our four agents is similar and 
characterized by homogeneous innovation cost, but in this section we relax 
assumption 2 partially and investigate the effect of heterogeneous innovation cost on 
location decision of firms. In fact we move one step toward real world businesses in 
which companies actually act with different technological level and there are some 
evidences that these differences can affect the location decision of firms as well. A 
prominent example in this regard is Microsoft, which became the industry leader 
after locating in Seattle, which at the time was not a centre for software development 
(Almazan 2007). For this purpose we consider two different scenarios which may 
exist and analyze the model accordingly.  
 
4.3.3.1. Innovation Cost is Heterogeneous just among Different 
Producer-Supplier Pair  
 
In this subsection we suppose that homogenous innovation cost imposes to first 
supplier and his respected producer in supply chain as well as the second supplier-
producer set while we have heterogeneity of innovation cost among these both pairs. 
So we normalize the innovation cost of second producer and his respected supplier 
to one while vary the innovation cost of first pair over an interval{ }0.5,5 . The reason 
of choosing this interval is that innovation costs which are less than half will not 
satisfy our constraints in optimization problem and amounts more than 5 will decline 
R&D efforts of firms dramatically such that the impact of knowledge spillovers goes 
down.  
Observation 5: In the first scenario considering conditions of subsection 4.3.3.1, 
when
1 1P S
ν ν ρ= < , second case which shows geographical concentration is the 
equilibrium, while with
1 1P S
ρ ν ν≤ = , first case which shows geographical isolation is the 
equilibrium such that the exact amount of ρ  depends on the value of our 
parameters. 
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In the first scenario for our first pair of producer-supplier is always of preference to 
act within concentration structure because regardless of the technological level of 
both pair, they obtain knowledge via γ which reduce their cost and increase their final 
outcome. On the other hand our second pair alters his location decision based on 
the level of technological differences, that is our second producer when encounter a 
technological level ρ times higher than his respected rival will find it more profitable 
to keep his physical distance from him and act in isolation as depicted in the first 
case to avoid any horizontal information disclosure. Figure 16 demonstrates the 
schematic results in which 1.8ρ = . 
Observation 6: In the Second scenario considering conditions of subsection 4.3.3.1, 
second case which shows geographical concentration is the equilibrium. 
Here our second producer dominantly prefers geographical concentration which 
enables him to receive knowledge from other agents with higher disclosure rate.  
Figure 17 depicts the result. 
 
4.3.3.2. Heterogeneous Innovation Cost Imposes just on Second 
Producer 
 
Now we investigate whether a very high-tech firm, that is here our second producer, 
with low innovation cost choose isolation structure to keep its knowledge capital or 
not. Hence, homogeneous innovation cost for first producer and both suppliers has 
been set to five and we change the innovation cost of second producer over the 
interval { }0.5,0.7 parametrically. In fact by setting the innovation cost of other agents 
to a big value like five, we treat them as low technological level firms. On the other 
hand we change the innovation cost of our second producer over the interval 
{ }0.5,0.7 which implies higher technological level in comparison with other agents. For 
the sake of more accurate results we consider two different levels of horizontal 
knowledge spillover 0.2γ = and 0.12γ = to be more sensitive on the effect of 
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innovation cost. Indeed by choosing 0.12γ = rather than 0.2γ =  we try to investigate 
the situation of more outward knowledge spillovers’ protection. 
Observation 7: In the first scenario considering conditions of subsection 4.3.3.2, first 
case is weakly preferred by the second producer which resulted geographical 
isolation as equilibrium. 
Here our second producer weakly prefers to locate himself far from first producer in 
order to avoid leakage of information to his rival. Although the results are not strong 
here and when innovation cost of second producer tend to 0.7 we face some kind of 
indifference behavior, but dominant preference of second supplier who really makes 
profit by being alone with his customer might cause some agreements in the real 
world which commit our first producer to stay in isolation. Figures 18 and 20 show 
the graphs for 0.2γ =  and 0.12γ = , and the result is robust upon parametrical 
changes. 
Observation 8: In the Second scenario considering conditions of subsection 4.3.3.2, 
second case which shows geographical concentration is the equilibrium. 
Although our second producer is more high-tech against other agents but he prefers 
to stay in concentration structure to benefit from disclosure of knowledge, but our 
numerical analysis show a weak preferences in this situation. Clearly other agents 
appreciate his presence near them. 
Figure 19 and 21 exhibit the results for 0.2γ =  and 0.12γ = respectively, and the 
result is completely robust upon parametrical changes. 
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Figure 16 
 First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions (Black: Case 1 & Blue: Case 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region (Black: Case 1 & Blue: Case 2) 
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Figure 18 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with 0.2γ =  (Green: Case 1 & Red: Case 2) 
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Figure 19 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with 0.2γ =  (Green: Case 1 & Red: Case 2) 
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Figure 20 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with 0.12γ =  (Black: Case 1 & Blue: Case 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with 0.12γ =  (Black: Case 1 & Blue: Case 2) 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Knowledge as a source of competitive advantage plays a vital role in nowadays 
business affairs such that in many cases affects the location decision of firms 
directly. Particularly, when we consider the location decision of innovative 
technology-based companies, the issue becomes more significant.  
In this research we tried to answer the question that under which circumstances 
vertical knowledge spillover via supply chain lead us to geographical concentration 
which Porter (1998) named it cluster. 
For this purpose a three-stage game theoretic model based on the inspiration of 
existing model in the literature of innovation, knowledge spillovers and economic 
geography has been established to empower us analyzing the subject more 
accurate. In our model we distinguished vertical knowledge spillover which occurs 
between a producer and its respected supplier from horizontal one happening 
between two firms of the same stream of the market. Moreover different 
technological level of our players was analyzed separately. Numerical approach with 
the utilization of Mathematica is applied to solve our strategic optimization problem. 
Results show that based on the selected values of parameters, imposed 
assumptions, and designed scenarios, different location decision might be made in 
which firms act within clusters or isolation. Observations 1-8 express the results 
which have been supported by graphs induced from our programming. Because of 
having reliability on our observations, broad ranges of parameters have been 
examined in order to guarantee the robustness of equilibrium outcomes.  
A main limitation of this paper which leads the research to enter numerical analysis 
was the mathematically complicated nature of final equations. This made the 
comparison between different scenarios completely intractable. Another limitation 
was the number of scenarios that we have considered that is more probable 
scenarios could enrich the results. 
Finally it might be useful to mention that different approaches can be applied to 
extend this work. Altering or relaxing each of our established assumptions in section 
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3 would open a new door, e.g. specific designed scenarios upon disposal of our 
supplier, assuming exogenous knowledge spillovers, can be developed. Moreover 
we have assumed that each producer is able just to provide his intermediate goods 
from his respected supplier and also each supplier can sell it only to his respected 
producer which would be an appropriate aspect of extension. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Strategic Technology Choice and 
Capacity Investment Decision: The 
Role of Salvage Market 
 
 
his essay examines the effect of salvage market on strategic 
technology choice and capacity investment decision of two firms 
that compete on the amount of output they produce under demand 
uncertainty. A game theoretic model applies such that in the first stage 
firms choose their production technology between two alternatives: 
modular production process (flexible technology) or unified production 
process (inflexible technology). Then at the second stage they decide 
on the amount of capacity investment: flexible firm makes decision 
about general and specific components’ capacity and inflexible firm just 
about unified component (final product). One stage forward both enter 
the primary market in which demand is uncertain and play a duopoly 
Cournot game on the amount of quantity they manufacture and finally 
at the last stage, flexible firm will be able to sell its unsold general 
components in the secondary market (salvage market) with a 
deterministic price. Solving optimization problems of the model results 
T 
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in intractable equations which lead us to employ numerical studies 
considering a specific probability distribution to observe equilibrium 
behavior of competing firms. Broad range of parameters with respect to 
established relationships among them have been examined in order to 
cover all the possible economically reasonable scenarios. Findings are 
expressed explicitly in the form of observations where we demonstrate 
that with symmetric parameterization there is a unique symmetric Nash 
equilibrium in which both firms choose inflexible technology while 
applying asymmetric parameters has the potential to form two types of 
equilibrium when 1. Both firms choose inflexible technology or 2. Only 
one firm chooses flexible technology. Moreover it is shown that there is 
a specific unified cost threshold that could shift the equilibrium of the 
game. Finally we discuss on the case that there is no equilibrium and 
mention some managerial implications of the model.  
 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
Intensive competition in global market and product-differentiation strategies of firms 
force the companies to make their investment decisions in more uncertain 
environment than before. Uncertainty about the size of the market for potential 
product and the purchasing behavior of consumers affect the strategic technology 
choice and capacity investment decision of firms. Actually operation managers try to 
minimize supply-demand mismatches by considering all available options in the 
competitive context before choosing their production line technology and decide on 
their capacity investment. On the other hand in some industries of developing 
countries there are large demands for unsold components of some industries in 
developed countries. In fact developing countries could play the role of salvage 
market for some companies that encounter low demand realization in the competitive 
market. Supplying residual general components of some products with prices lower 
than total cost although implies negative numbers in bottom line of financial 
statements of a company, has the potential of covering some greater loss. 
Consequently, investment on a modular production line that can further assemble a 
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general and specific component of the final product create the opportunity to respond 
to the probable demand for unsold components in secondary market. Moreover it 
can equip the firm with a production technology to hedge against demand 
uncertainty. Obviously firm should pay more for extra desirability.  
In this paper we explore how the existence of a secondary non-sale capacity market 
(which we call it salvage market) for unsold general components of a producer 
affects its strategic technology choice and respected capacity investment decision 
considering demand variability in the primary market. Our point of departure is the 
Goyal and Netessine (2007) three-stage model of technology, capacity investment 
and production games. They show that how a monopolist and duopolist respond to a 
given flexibility premium. Moreover in contrast with common belief, they conclude 
that flexibility is not always the best response to competition such that flexible and 
dedicated technologies may coexist in equilibrium. They consider two firms that 
invest in two products and compete with each other in two markets. We introduce 
salvage market with specific characteristics to their model in which the flexible firm 
who invests in more expensive technology is able to resell its residual general 
components with loss. Indeed we focus on the strategic decisions of two producers 
upon choosing modular versus unified production line. Modular production line 
(flexible technology) is designed to assemble general and specific components with 
higher total cost but can be used as strategic weapon in the presence of demand 
uncertainty by postponing the production process. On the other hand unified 
production line (inflexible or dedicated technology) manufactures the final product 
without any assembly phase with lower total cost and can be used as commitment 
device for the producer which ensures the customers of receiving certain amount of 
goods regardless of the demand realization in the primary market. Furthermore 
flexible firm will be able afterwards to enter the salvage market reselling its residual 
general components with loss, the advantage that does not exist for inflexible 
producer.  
In order to solve the model we have been obliged to apply numerical approach 
because of intractability of our final equations and integrals. Moreover uniform 
distribution function is assumed for handling our demand uncertainty. Under 
symmetric parameterization we demonstrate that there is a unique symmetric Nash 
equilibrium such that both producers decide on choosing inflexible (or dedicated) 
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technology and produce the final product via unified production process. In addition 
optimal capacity and profits of firms are strictly increasing in mean and standard 
deviation of the demand intercepts. Under asymmetric parameterization we reach 
two types of equilibria such that whether both firms choose inflexible technology or 
just one firm chooses the flexible technology. There is a threshold unified cost 
around which equilibrium can shift. Disequilibrium also can emerge under some 
range of parameterization such that we show equilibrium in pure strategies for 
capacity investment fails to exist if the degree of demand variability exceeds a 
threshold level. The point is that this range of parameters is far from real-world 
business considerations.  
This paper contributes to the available outstanding literature on manufacturing 
flexibility and production technology by studying the effect of the existence of a non-
sale-capacity market which we call it salvage market (or secondary market B ) on 
the technology choice and capacity investment decision of firms that compete under 
demand uncertainty. We think that it is worthwhile to investigate this uncovered area 
of the literature via a separated study. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In part 2 we briefly review the 
available related literature in OM and IO. Section 3 explains the basic general model, 
and §4 deals with the methodology of solving our problem. In section 5 we report 
and discuss the findings of our extensive numerical studies plus managerial 
implication of this setting, and §6 concludes this paper. Technical appendix at the 
end of the paper details the calculation of the model and respected assumptions.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Seminal papers in the field of industrial economics and operation management deal 
with this subject. Production and pricing postponement strategies of producers with 
respect to revelation of uncertain demand are at the heart of these researches, some 
investigate just the monopolistic scenario and others consider duopoly competition.  
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Chod and Rudi (2005) investigated the effect of resource flexibility and responsive 
pricing for a monopolist doing business in two markets. By using normal distribution 
in their paper, they show that capacity investment and respected profit are increasing 
in demand variability, a result that consistently exists in our competitive setting too. 
Considering market competition, Anupindi and Jiang (2008) endogenize capacity 
investment, production and pricing decision in their competitive model and evaluate 
the interplay between the timing of demand realization and production decision of 
firms with different capabilities. They also establish the strategic equivalence of price 
and quantity competitions when firms are flexible. Moreover in their model they 
characterize equilibria considering two different kinds of demand uncertainty: 
additive and multiplicative. In our model we deal with additive shock only. Reynolds 
and Wilson (2000) did their research on the context of symmetric Bertrand-
Edgeworth competition and analyzed investment and pricing incentives of firms 
under demand variability. In their model firms decide on production level ex ante 
demand realization while price decision occurs ex post demand revelation. They 
show that if the extent of demand variation exceeds a threshold level then a 
symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist, a result that also observable 
in our findings.  
Anand and Girotra (2007) investigate the strategic perils of delayed differentiation 
and its effect on consumer surplus and welfare. They demonstrate that in the 
presence of either entry threat or competition, these strategic effects can diminish 
the value of delayed differentiation (versus early differentiation). In their model they 
let the producers to decide on the timing of customization freely considering 
distribution center (DC). Fine and Pappu (1990) evaluate tactical and strategic usage 
of flexible manufacturing system (FMS) under market competition. Tactical as it 
helps firm to respond quickly to variation in demand within a market or to decrease 
the level of inventory and strategic as it equips the firm with a tool to defend its own 
market and to enter the markets of its less flexible rival. Actually in their two-firm 
repeated-game model, flexibility serves as a mechanism to prevent market entry by 
having the potential power of attacking to the competitor’s markets (grim strategy). 
Indeed they show how the availability of FMS can make firms worse off.  
McCabe (2011) in its empirical study evaluates the reliability factors for salvage 
value of photovoltaic (PV). He expressed that as PV system prices become less 
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expensive, the salvage value can be increasingly important in life cycle economic 
calculations. He concludes that there is a healthy resale market for PV modules that 
should be recognized in project level economic evaluation and as systems costs 
become lower and lower (because of competition), salvage value has more 
significant ramifications.  
Cachon and Koek (2007) explain how to estimate a salvage value of an unsold 
order. They pointed a quote that describes the economics of selling fashion ski 
apparel, as faced by Sport Obermeyer: “units left over at the end of the season were 
sold at a loss that averaged 8% of the … price.” They believe that choosing a fixed 
salvage value is questionable and its pricing depends on the amount of left 
inventory. 
 
3. The Model 
 
Consider an economy in which two firms indexed by i and j , , 1, 2i j = and i j≠
producing a homogenous final product. Both firms are assumed to be risk neutral 
and maximize their expected profits considering the actions of respected rival. Based 
on the production process technology a single firm chooses, it will be able to produce 
the final product via whether the unified process or the modular process. 
Choosing unified production process enables a firm to manufacture the final product 
with lower costs and also can be interpreted as a strategic commitment device 
whereby a firm commits to bring a certain quantity to market (Anupindi, Jiang 2008). 
On the other hand, choosing modular production process implies that a firm invests 
on a more expensive technology which empowers it to manufacture the final product 
with higher costs by producing a general component – which can be used in other 
products- assembled sequentially with a specific component which is specialized for 
certain product based on the demand information of the market. 
Following the terminology of Anupindi and Jiang (2008), we assume that the firm 
invests on unified production process is inflexible (N) and the one chooses the 
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modular process is flexible (F) as well. Also we assume that a firm cannot invest in 
flexible and inflexible technologies simultaneously. 
Flexible firm will be able to postpone its production ex post realization of demand 
which implies more effective reaction to the volatility of market; so it needs to tradeoff 
the higher costs of flexibility and its ability to hedge against demand uncertainty. On 
the other hand, inflexible firm commits to produce a certain amount of final good ex 
ante revelation of demand. 
We consider two separated markets here: Market A and market B in which our firms 
could compete with each other. Market A is the primary market in which demand is 
uncertain and regardless of the technology choice of our firms, they compete on the 
quantity of final output in it. (Cournot duopoly competition) Market B is the secondary 
market with deterministic demand for the general component of the final product 
which can be produced only by the firm chooses the flexible technology. In fact 
inflexible firm cannot enter this market. Clearly speaking, there is no demand for the 
final product or specific component in market B .  Price is also set beforehand less 
than unit cost of general component procurement.  
This paper contributes to the available outstanding literature on manufacturing 
flexibility and production technology by studying the effect of the existence of a non-
sale-capacity market which we call it salvage market (or secondary market B ) on 
the technology choice and capacity investment decision of firms that compete under 
demand uncertainty. 
A four-stage game theoretic model is applied such that in the first three stages, our 
firms play a simultaneous-move non cooperative game with complete information. 
 
Figure 1: Four-Stage Static Game 
                                                                                                  Demand Revealed                       
                                            
            
         t=1                                             t=2                                           t=3                                   t=4 
Technology Decision             Capacity Decision                Cournot Competition        Salvage Market for GC 
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In the first stage 1t = , each firm can invest either in a flexible technology (F) that 
enables it to manufacture both general and specific components - which later can be 
assembled and sold in market A  or supplies the general component with known 
price to market B - or an inflexible technology (N) which allows the firm to produce 
and supply the final product with lower production costs and higher commitment to 
market A . 
Following Goyal and Netessine (2007), three subgames can potentially emerge: 
1. Mixed subgame in which one firm invests in flexible and its rival in inflexible 
technology denoted by m . ((F,N) or (N,F)) 
2. Flexible subgame in which both firms invest in flexible technology and have 
the opportunity to supply the general component in market B, denoted by f . 
(F,F) 
3. Inflexible subgame in which both firms choose inflexible technology and the 
game lasts until the end of the third stage, denoted byn . (N,N) 
The superscript expresses the subgame which our firm plays denoted by ,m f or n . 
Moreover to differentiate firms from each other, the firm index ,i j appears in the 
subscript as well. 
In the second stage 2t = , each firm invests either in a production capacity of the 
final product via the unified production process when it adopts inflexible technology 
or in general and specific components’ capacities when it chooses flexible one 
considering the point that general component can be sold separately in market B . 
Subscripts g and s refer to general and specific components respectively. Moreover 
subscript u refers to the final product which is manufactured via unified process. 
We denote all capacities by X , e.g. mgiX is the capacity of the general component 
which can be produced by firm i when its rival chooses inflexible technology. (Mixed 
subgame) 
Capacity investment is costly and we let these costs to differ by firms. We assume 
that the cost of purchasing general and specific resources be gic and sic  per unit 
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respectively and the cost of the inflexible resources be uic  per unit for firm i . We let 
the total costs of producing a unit of the final product via the modular process to be
Mi gi siC c c= + while for the unified process to be Ui uiC c= and so Ui MiC C< . For the sake 
of simplicity, we ignore the assembly cost of general and specific component and 
assume that it is sunk in gic and sic . 
The expected optimal payoff of the firm is denoted byΠ , so e.g. mMiΠ denotes the 
expected profit of firm i that compete with firm j in the mixed subgame and invests in 
two general and specific components via the modular production process technology 
with capacities mgiX and
m
siX . 
In the third stage 3t = , firms play a Cournot duopoly game on the quantity of final 
product they manufacture denoted byq . This decision is ex post because at the time 
of production, the firm is better aware of the market demand information.  
The linear inverse demand function for the final product which is supplied to market
A is ( ),A A A A AP A Q A Q= −  in which A iA jAQ q q= +  is the total quantity of the final 
product supplied to the primary market by our firms combined. (Cournot competition 
model with linear demand function) and AP  is price of the final product in market A  
which is assumed to be nonnegative. Subscript A  refers to the primary market A . 
Demand uncertainty appears in the intercepts of the linear inverse demand function, 
AA +∈ℜ which draws from a continuous distribution function F with density function
f The mean and variance of the marginal distribution is denoted by Aµ and 
2
Aσ  
respectively. 
We denote profit in the Cournot game by π and E  represent the expectation 
operator with respect to the random variable AA . Following Goyal and Netessine 
(2007), marginal cost of production in this stage is normalized to zero. We consider 
this cost in our capacity decision stage. 
Finally in the last stage 4t = , the firm that has chosen the flexible technology can 
enter the secondary market B and supplies its unsold general components as a price 
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taker with the deterministic price less than the unit procurement cost of general 
component which is Bi giP c< . Consistent with Roller and Tombak (1990, 1993), 
modular production process is a prerequisite for entering the secondary market. 
Figure 2 which is inspired by Anand and Girotra (2007) visually summarizes the 
explained procedure.  
Figure 2: Modular vs. Unified Production Process 
 
 
3.1. Problem Formulation 
Based on the technology choice of our firms which we categorized as three different 
subgames, this stage could contain zero, one or two player as well. We denote 
payoff in market B  by ν which is revenue minus costs there.  
Following Fine and Pappu (1990) and Roller and Tombak (1990, 1993), we can 
simply show the technology choice of the firms in a strategic-form game by a 2 2×
matrix as depicted in following page. Matrix entries represent profits in the second-
stage capacity game. Backward induction is applied to capture the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of this model. Hence we move by analyzing from the last 
stage 4t = considering all three possible subgame of the technology choice of our 
firm. The optimization problem for a firm i  that chooses modular production process 
technology (Flexible firm) for any strategic choice of its competitor j  is: 
Stage 4: Secondary Market for General Component 
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[ ]max .
iB
i iB Biq
q Pν =  Such that ( )0 iB gi iAq X q≤ ≤ −  
Stage 3: Cournot Duopoly Competition  
( )max .
iA
Mi A iA jA iA iq
A q q qπ ν = − − +   Such that 0 min ,iA gi siq X X ≤ ≤    
Stage 2: Capacity Decision Investment 
( )
,
max . .
gi si
Mi Mi gi gi si siX X
E c X c Xπ Π = − −   Such that , 0gi siX X ≥  
The optimization problem for a firm i  that chooses unified production process 
technology (Inflexible firm) for any strategic choice of its competitor j  is: 
Stage 4: Secondary Market for General Component 
0iν =  
Stage 3: Cournot Duopoly Competition  
( )max .
iA
Ui A iA jA iAq
A q q qπ  = − −   Such that 0 iA Uiq X≤ ≤  
Stage 2: Capacity Decision Investment 
( )max .
ui
Ui Ui ui uiX
E c XπΠ = −    Such that 0uiX ≥   
                                        
Figure 3: The Strategic-Form of the Technology Game 
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4. Methodology  
 
In order to solve the model and find the technology choice as well as optimal 
capacity investment decision of each firm, we proceed by considering each subgame 
of the model. Backward induction is applied to find the optimal payoff of each 
probable subgame which afterwards will be located as entries of our mentioned 
matrix to analyze the equilibria of the model. For the sake of simplicity, we make two 
assumptions and establish a lemma as follows: 
Assumption 1: We assume that both firms enter the game, choose a production 
technology and make a positive capacity investment which implies that
( )( ,0) 0A MP A c′≥ for any realization of demand. 
Assumption 2: We assume that price is nonnegative for any realization of demand. 
Lemma 1: The flexible firm avoids the excess supply of specific components which 
exists no demand for it in the salvage market B  that is Si giX X≤ or min ,Si gi SiX X X  =  . 
Based on the model described in previous section, we establish the Lagrangian 
function of firms in each of mentioned three subgames. Maximization problems are 
solved using first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions, but whereas demand is uncertain 
when firms involve capacity investment decisions, we should consider different 
states. Each state could happen according to the different probable realization of 
market size shown by A . Hence backward induction approach implies that firms 
encounter expected profit functions in capacity investment game. Expectation 
operator leads us to integrals with the boundaries which are functions of capacities 
and this fact makes our calculation really messy and almost intractable. To simplify 
the problem we try to specify the probability distribution function of our random 
variable which appears in the intercept of linear inverse demand function and 
therefore uniform distribution function F with density ( )f A  is chosen.  
1 , 0
0 ,
( )
A M
M
Otherwise
f A
≤ ≤
= 
  
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Also we add a symmetry assumption between both firms on respected costs’ and 
also salvage market price’ parameters. (See assumptions TA.3 and TA.4 in 
appendix) 
Whereas these assumptions did not reach us to some gentle equations, we employ 
an extensive numerical study to find out the strategic behavior of our agents. For this 
purpose, a wide range of plausible parameters’ values chosen to represent realistic 
scenarios from the real-world businesses. These parameters include costs (general 
and specific component for flexible firm and unified component for inflexible one 
shown respectively by gc , sc and uc ), price of the residual general component of 
flexible firm in salvage market notated by BP  and finally M that is a finite positive 
sufficiently large number such that if demand realization were on the upper bound of 
probability distribution, all capacities are bounded. Here M has an important 
interpretation which is inherently in the nature of uniform distribution. Actually the 
mean and variance of uniform distribution simply are 2
M
µ = and
22
12
M
σ =  respectively 
which means that the mean and variance of the random variable A  (Reservation 
price of the market) is increasing in M . For each parameter combination, we 
calculated the equilibrium under assumed subgames and determined capacities and 
profits. The numerical study consists of a large amount of instances resulting from 
every possible combination of the values listed in Table 1. Detailed calculation of 
mathematical stuff is put simply in technical appendix.   
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Table 1: Parameter Values Used in Numerical Study 
Parameter Values 
Demand Distribution Uniform 
  
M  (3,120) 
µ  
2
M
 
2σ  
2
12
M  
uc  (1,10] 
gc  (0.75,10] 
sc  (0.75,10] 
BP  (0.5,10) 
Parameters‘ Relations: B gP c< , u g sc c c< +  
 
5. Findings 
 
The main part of our analysis contains the technology game in which both firms 
make decision between modular and unified manufacturing process that afterwards 
affects the capacity investment decision of them. Seminal papers including Goyal 
and Netessine (2007) or Chod and Rudi (2005), despite of some differences in 
modeling, tried to avoid numerical analysis in this phase and therefore imposed 
some additional assumptions to ease the analytical discussion. For example Goyal 
and Netessine (2007) assume that each firm produces to capacity called it 
clearance. Numerical approach to solve and analyze of this problem considering a 
specific distribution function is a missing part of literature that we are going to cover 
here. In order to preclude any uncovered set of parameters and results, we were 
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obsessive in examining the parameters. For the purpose of having comprehensive 
results, also we investigate some sets of parameters which exist numerically but 
could be interpreted hard economically.  
For implementing numerical method, first we choose a reference starting point and 
then apply incremental approach based on the assumed relationship between 
parameters, also try to investigate extreme values of them. Optimal capacities and 
respected maximum profits of producers subsequently are put in the matrix of 
technology game depicted in figure 3. In this phase probable equilibrium of the game 
can be found out by comparing some explicit numbers representing the firms’ 
optimal profit. For detailed mathematical steps refer to technical appendix. 
 
5.1. Best Reply Functions 
In this subsection we are going to characterize the best reply functions of our 
producers in the capacity investment game. Lemmas 2-4 characterize the best 
response functions of both firms. Proofs are put in the technical appendix. 
Lemma 2: In flexible subgame of the capacity investment game where both firms 
choose modular production process, optimal capacities are characterized by best 
response functions as follows: 
222 42.250.75
0.25 1.5 0,
i i
X X XP X XP si sj sjB si siBc c M P X for firm is g B siM M M M M
⋅
− − + + − − + − + − =  
22 4 4 22
0,
j j
P X X X XP X X B sj si sj sjB si sic c P for firm js g B M M M M M
⋅
− − + − − + + − =  
Lemma 3: In inflexible subgame of the capacity investment game where both firms 
choose unified production process, optimal capacities are characterized by best 
response functions as follows: 
22 21.5
2 0,2i
X X XXM ui uj ujuic X X for firm iu ui ujM M M− + − + − + + =  
22 2 2
2 0,2 2j
X X XXM ui uj ujuic X X for firm ju ui ujM M M− + − + − + + =  
Lemma 4: In mixed subgame of the capacity investment game where one firm 
chooses modular production process while the competitor chooses unified one, 
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optimal capacities are characterized by best response functions as follows: (without 
loss of generality we assume firm i is flexible and firm j is inflexible) 
( ) 2 2 22 2 22 26 9
2 0,2 2
si uj B B si si ujB si siB si si
g s B si uji i
X X P P X X XP X XP X XM
c c P X X for firm iM M M M M
− − − +− − ⋅
− − + + − + + + − + + =  
22 2 2
2 0,2 2
si uj ujsi
u j si uj
X X XXM
c X X for firm jM M M− + − + − + + =  
Optimal capacities afterwards should be plugged in respected profit functions to lead 
us toward equilibria. 
 
5.2. Symmetric Parameterization  
Here we start our analysis by assuming symmetry in parameters such that both firms 
face similar cost of capacities in symmetric subgames ( , )F F and ( , )N N . Moreover in 
flexible subgame each should sell the rest of their general component in salvage 
market with a fixed predetermined price BP . (See assumption TA.4 in technical 
appendix) Figure 4 shows the pair of parameters for each producer that is 
considered as inputs of numerical solution.  
 
Figure 4: Symmetric Parameterization 
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Observation 1: Under symmetric parameterization condition, the unique equilibrium 
of the technology game is the subgame ( , )N N that is both firms choose inflexible 
technology and produce the final product via unified production process. Moreover 
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this is a symmetric equilibrium such that both choose same amount of capacity 
investment that is * *n nX XUi Uj= which leads to the same optimal profits
* *n n
Ui UjΠ = Π .    
Observation 2: Optimal capacity and respected profits of firms are strictly increasing 
in mean 2
M
µ =  and variance
22
12
M
σ = of the demand intercept and strictly decreasing in 
the cost of unified component
uC . (Figures 5 and 6 depict the result for specific 
amount of parameters.) 
Choosing inflexible technology (or unified production process here) can be 
interpreted as a strategic device whereby a firm commits to bring certain quantity to 
market. Actually the firm benefits more from the value of this commitment rather than 
any flexibility premium it may obtain from the capability to postpone production 
(Anupindi, Jiang 2008). Our first observation is also consistent with the result of 
Anupindi and Jiang (2008) that is when 2
M
cuµ = > and distribution (.)F has IGFR 
(Increasing Generalized Failure Rate) property, which uniform distribution has, there 
exist unique symmetric equilibrium capacity of a firm in a symmetric inflexible 
duopoly. 
The second observation is different from the finding of Goyal and Netessine (2007) 
that capacity decisions do not depend on variance of demand intercepts. In fact this 
happens because of the nature of specific probability distribution we choose 
(Uniform distribution) and also relaxing a tough assumption of that seminal paper 
that was each firm produces to capacity. The main reason is inherent in the 
characteristics of uniform distribution such that any change in M causes the 
simultaneous changes in mean and also variance of demand intercepts (Figure 7).  
Although in uniform distribution mean and variance are both the function of one 
variable, here M , but as it is shown in figure 7, for 6M > variance becomes greater 
than mean and for 3M > raises with higher rate than mean. It implies two effects 
which are happening with increment of M simultaneously: First, an increase in the 
amount of dispersion escalates the probability of both high and low demand 
realizations and second, a more attractive mean of market size. 
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Figure 5: Optimal Capacity Investment in Inflexible Subgame 
        
 
Figure 6: Optimal Profit in Inflexible Subgame 
      
 
As it shown in figure 7 the first effect is stronger for 6M > and vice versa. The first 
effect implies more uncertainty which intuitively might support the usage of flexible 
technology and the second effect reinforces the investment on inflexible production 
line in order to commit to a larger market with lower production cost. Furthermore 
higher variance and uncertainty spells that for some specific demand realizations, 
the market clearing price will be zero and so the firm faces some non-sale capacities 
that in the case of being flexible producer, will be able to enter salvage market and 
sell the general components with loss. Consequently both firms confront a complex 
trade-off which has a route in demand uncertainty and cost of producing unified 
component. Numerical analysis explicitly shows that both firms dominantly prefer to 
choose inflexible technology and ( , )N N is the unique equilibrium of the technology 
game. 
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Moreover firms should take into consideration that choosing flexible technology, 
within this symmetric parameterization setting, needs two conditions to be more 
profitable decision: first, the competitor also should play F and second the firm 
should invest more rather than its rival on capacity; otherwise you encounter a big 
loss. Thus playing F has an incredible threat for each manufacturer which leads to 
the subgame ( , )N N . Indeed this situation is a kind of prisoner’s dilemma game. 
In the next subsection we run numerical method by considering kinds of asymmetry 
in some parameters of our established model. 
 
Figure 7: Mean & Variance of Uniform Distribution 
 
 
5.3. Asymmetric Parameterization  
Here we relax the assumption of having symmetric parameterization and let our firms 
obtain their technologies with different investment costs. We can reasonably imagine 
a case in which both producers having access to similar inflexible technology but 
they can have different technological level of flexible modular production line. 
Actually we have implicitly assumed that flexible production strategy is a newer 
higher technological option that tries to strategically convince stakeholders to invest 
on it in order to reap more profits from the uncertain demand in the market in 
comparison with the available inflexible one which is accessible for all firms with 
same investment cost. Thus in this section we try to scrutinize the scenario that both 
firms encounter symmetric investment costs when choosing inflexible technology
ui ujc c= but asymmetric flexible technological level gi gjc c≠ . Figure 8 summarizes the 
respected parameters’ consideration. 
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 Figure 8: Asymmetric Parameterization 
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Observation 3: Depending on the relative cost of technologies and the upper bound 
of random variable M , it is possible to have two types of equilibrium which is 1. 
Both firms are inflexible ( , )N N or 2. Only one is flexible { ( , )F N or ( , )N F }. 
Observation 4: There is a threshold cost of manufacturing the final product via 
unified production process Thresholduc , after which the firm with access to higher flexible 
technological capability (smaller Mc ) finds it more profitable to alter its strategic 
technology choice from inflexible technology to flexible one which results in 
asymmetric equilibrium { ( , )F N or ( , )N F }. 
Observation 5: For sufficiently small amount of M relative to capacity costs, there 
is a unique Nash equilibrium for this game that is both firms choose inflexible 
technology ( , )N N . 
Observation 6: For sufficiently large amount of M relative to capacity costs, there 
is whether a unique Nash equilibrium for this game that is both firms chooses 
inflexible technology ( , )N N or there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
In this setting two factors actually have significant effects on strategic decisions of 
our players: first, the perception of producers about the parameter M which implies 
the maximum possible realization of our random variable A (intercepts of the inverse 
demand function). It is basically the art of marketing research activities of a company 
to estimate properly this influential parameter which appears in mean and also 
variance of the random factor and afterwards affects the strategic decision of firm 
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and also plays role in determination of the amount of capacity investment and 
respected profits. Second, relative capacity costs of two rival firms which explicitly 
can change their strategic technology choice.  
Moreover as we are working with uniform distribution in this setting, M at the same 
time clarifies two facts about the market: first, higher M spells more attractive mean 
of the price reservation. Second, an increase in M increases the likelihood of both 
high and low demand realizations that is although higher M  motivates the producer 
to take the flexible modular production line but simultaneously increases the threat of 
higher loss because of very low demand realization and this kind of analysis is 
reinforced with usage of uniform distribution as we allocate same probability to each 
level of demand realization. Actually this is the main reason that we face 
disequilibrium in sufficiently large value of M with respect to capacity costs in some 
sets of parameters (Observation 6). On the other hand lower M implies less volatile 
market which decreases the motivation of investment in more expensive flexible 
technology such that in sufficient small values of M with respect to capacity costs 
( , )N N is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game (Observation 5).  
Consistent with Anupindi and Jiang (2008) we encounter a threshold unified cost -
which can be changed with respect to M and modular costs- that whenever
Threshold
u uc c< , both firms choose inflexible technology and ( , )N N is the unique Nash 
equilibrium of the game, but otherwise the firm with access to higher flexible 
technological level (lower Mc ) finds it more profitable to invest on flexible production 
line. This results in the formation of asymmetric equilibrium { ( , )F N or ( , )N F } 
(Observations 3 and 4). Also it should be pointed out that when one manufacturer 
decides on this strategic move from symmetric inflexible choice to asymmetric 
flexible one, in some ranges of M it increases the profits of both firms and make 
them better off. This result depends critically on M such that with higher M the 
inflexible firm should invest less on capacity and makes less profit in comparison to 
its flexible rival. Actually higher M causes more marginal benefit for flexible firm 
which we intuitively expect. 
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In our setting as we focus on the effect of salvage market on strategic choice of 
producers and since the flexible firm is able to sell its unsold general components 
with predetermined price less than its cost there B gP c< , so in our parameterization 
we have weighted the modular cost with concentration on gc rather than sc and 
avoided the investigation of extreme scenarios that the main part of the total modular 
cost exist in specific components such that s gc c . In fact in this case as the 
revenue of flexible firm in salvage market becomes subtle, there will be no motivation 
on choosing more expensive modular production line which implicitly bypasses the 
attraction of our salvage market. 
Also it can be observed from numerical studies that the most amount of investment 
on capacities takes place in the symmetric flexible subgame in which both producers 
rely on their ability to sell their residual general components in salvage market with 
loss. Obviously here the firm that access to higher flexible technology (lower Mc ) gets 
more profit. Although we have assumed that our firms are risk neutral this behavior 
shows a level of risk taking that is firms hope to face high demand realization in 
order to obtain more profit. As shown in figure 6 profit is convex and increasing with 
respect to demand uncertainty which also reinforce the idea of risk seeking behavior 
of producers. Moreover in this case and in the presence of uniform distribution, in 
higher M , risk of facing loss (negative profit) is also high. These are the main 
reasons that banned the existence of symmetric flexible equilibrium ( , )F F as with 
low M it is not attractive to invest on more expensive less probable modular 
production technology and in sufficiently large range of M in comparison with 
inflexible unified technology, it is risky to take flexible technology while the higher 
standard deviation the larger probability of facing very low demand realization. 
 
Example 1: (Observation 3, 4) Consider an economic situation in which both firms 
deal with these amount of parameters: maximum possible realization amount of 
demand intercept is considered 24M = , fixed price of the residual general 
component in the salvage market is 1BP = , and costs of producing final product via 
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modular and unified production process for firm ,i j are expressed as following two 
scenarios: 
Scenario 1: 1.1, 1.5, 1, 2c c c c c cgi gj si sj ui uj= = = = = =  
Scenario 2: 1.1, 1.5, 1, 1.75c c c c c cgi gj si sj ui uj= = = = = =  
Actually compare to second scenario, in the first scenario we have assumed that our 
first producer, here firm i , have access to higher level of flexible technology relative 
to inflexible one. Based on lemmas 2-4 and after calculation of optimal capacity 
investment decision of producers, optimal profits of them are depicted in figure 9 and 
10 as follows.  
 
   Figure 9: Optimal Profits (Scenario 1)   Figure 10: Optimal Profits (Scenario 2) 
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As shown in above mentioned figures, in the first scenario we have asymmetric 
equilibrium of ( , )F N while in the second scenario both firms choose inflexible 
technology and ( , )N N is equilibrium (Observation 3). Indeed there is a threshold 
cost of manufacturing the final product via unified production process Thresholduc , here a 
number between 1.75 and 2.0, after which the firm with access to higher flexible 
technological capability (smaller Mc ) chooses modular production process 
(Observation 4). □ 
 
Example 2: (Observation 5) In this example consider the case in which both firms 
estimate a small value for maximum possible realization of our random variable that 
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is 8M = , price in the secondary market is assumed to be constant 1BP =  and costs of 
producing final product via modular and unified production process for firm ,i j are 
expressed as follows: 1.1, 1.5, 1, 2.1c c c c c cgi gj si sj ui uj= = = = = = . Optimal profits of producers 
are shown in figure 11. As you see in the cost structure of this example, intuitively for 
firm i is better to invest on flexible technology because first, there is no cost 
advantage in choosing unified production line and second it can react more 
accurately to demand uncertainty in the primary market. But on the contrary because 
of the important role of M we will see that under competition it prefers to choose 
inflexible technology and ( , )N N is the unique Nash equilibrium. □ 
 
Example 3: (Observation 6) Now consider the case in which both firms estimate a 
large value for maximum possible realization amount of demand intercept that is
50M = , price in the salvage market is fixed to 1BP =  and costs of producing final 
product via modular and unified production process for firm ,i j are expressed as 
follows: 1.1, 1.5, 1, 2.05c c c c c cgi gj si sj ui uj= = = = = = . Optimal profits of producers are shown in 
figure 12. As it can be induced from the matrix, there exists no pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium in this setting of parameters in which firm i has access to a higher 
technological level of modular production line. A technology which is approximately 
imposes same costs in comparison of employing unified production line. (If we 
decrease the unified cost from 2.05 there is a threshold cost under which ( , )N N is 
the unique Nash equilibrium of the game) □ 
 
 Figure 11: Optimal profits (Example 2) 
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Figure 12: Optimal profits (Example 3) 
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5.4. Managerial Implication 
Intensive competition in free market and product-differentiation strategies of firms 
force the companies to make their investment decisions in more uncertain 
environment than before. Uncertainty about the size of the market for potential 
product and the purchasing behavior of consumers affect the strategic technology 
choice and capacity investment decision of firms. Considering minimum supply-
demand mismatches plus investment costs enter the strategic decision making 
process of CEOs.  
For this purpose managers take into consideration the possibility of using flexible 
technology which enables them to customize the final product based on the request 
of consumers and also avoid huge inventory costs. They can reduce the production 
lead time and wait more to obtain updated near-to-real information about the 
consumers demand. This strategy has its own disadvantageous, for instance could 
affect the long term contracts of the firm with its suppliers or direct customers such 
that the firm could not commit to sell a specific quantity of raw materials or bring a 
certain amount of the final product to the market and it may cause the reduction in 
long-run profits. Moreover access to this kind of modular production lines has more 
investment costs that should be considered beforehand. 
As shown in our results choosing flexible technology is not always the best strategic 
choice of a company, rather, in the presence of competition and uniform probability 
distribution, in more cases firms avoid of taking that. Actually managers should 
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characterize carefully a complex set of parameters such as investment costs, 
distribution function of the random variable (intercepts of the inverse demand 
function) and its respected elements. Here we try to focus on a specific situation that 
was not investigated in previous literatures such that the flexible producer is able to 
enter a secondary less attractive market to sell its unsold general components. 
Indeed these residual general components are the result of low demand realization. 
Incidentally managers should be obsessive in determination of influential parameters 
since they can shift the equilibrium of the game and affect capacity investment as 
well as firm’s profit. For example as it was shown, asymmetry in the flexible costs 
could convince a CEO to choose a different production technology from its rival or 
high enough estimation of M could adversely influence strategic decision of firms 
because of disequilibrium outcome.  
Finally it was discussed in this research that the existence of a salvage market which 
might be ignored in some strategic-level decisions like technology choice could be 
important. Basically it is an opportunity to encourage managers to take more risk 
under uncertain market demand structure. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we present a model to focus on the effect of the existence of a non-sale 
capacity market (salvage market) on strategic technology choice and capacity 
investment decision of two firms that compete under stochastic price-dependant 
demand structure. Actually we take a different approach toward the concepts of 
flexible production technology and product postponement. Our model is inspired by 
seminal previous research in this field like Goyal & Netessine (2007) and Anupindi & 
Jiang (2008). In this setting each firm involves in three non-cooperative games: 
technology game (flexible vs. inflexible), capacity investment game (general, specific 
and unified components) and finally duopoly Cournot game on the amount of 
quantity. We assumed that flexible firm has the permission to enter the salvage 
market to ameliorate its excess investment in general components that could occur 
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because of low demand realization. The model is presented in general form, but as it 
could be followed in technical appendix some simplifying assumptions were essential 
for solving purposes. Assuming uniform distribution function also did not help us 
arriving to explicit tractable destination, thus numerical analysis considering broad 
range of parameters is applied.  
We show that depending on the specific values of the problem parameters, three 
equilibria including ( , )N N , ( , )F N and ( , )N F could arise. It was discussed that under 
symmetric problem parameterization, ( , )N N is the unique Nash equilibrium of the 
game, but in asymmetric setting it is possible to have asymmetric equilibrium in 
which only one firm chooses flexible technology. In fact the flexible firm proves the 
effect of salvage market in strategic-level decision of managers who encouraged by 
this secondary market to invest on more expensive but better adjusted production 
line. Moreover we show in asymmetric case there is a unified cost threshold that can 
shift the equilibrium of the game. Also the important role of maximum possible 
market price reservation M is discussed extensively and it is demonstrated that 
capacity investment and profit of firms are increasing in M . Disequilibrium also 
appears as a result of some specific asymmetric parameterization. Contrary to the 
common opinion that flexibility is always a competitive advantage against rivals in 
uncertain markets, it is shown here that the existence of salvage market could 
convince the managers to employ it just under some specific conditions.  
Several limitations affect the findings of this paper. Uniform distribution is the 
maximum entropy probability distribution for a random variable that has no constraint 
except its support interval while in real-world businesses, firms with extensive market 
research activities has some knowledge about the demand behavior of consumers. 
Moreover sufficiently large amount of M under asymmetric problem parameterization 
eventuate disequilibrium that could restrict the prediction power of our model, even 
considering the point that large value of M with respect to investment costs implies 
very high price reservation that within some range of M seems not very logical. 
Furthermore setting a fixed price for salvage market is a little bit tough assumption 
that could be revised in further extension. Development of web-based platforms like 
eBay, Amazon, or other second hand online markets besides considering large scale 
salvage markets could be a motivation for further study in this field. Revision the 
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structure of our salvage market, considering two products in primary market, add 
partial flexibility by letting firms to choose simultaneously flexible and inflexible 
technologies have the potential of further research. 
 
Technical Appendix  
 
Here, the solutions to the production and the capacity games as well as the effect of 
our salvage market for non sale general components of flexible firm are explained 
considering assumptions 1, 2 and lemma 1. For these purposes three different 
subgames - as perfectly done by Goyal and Netessine (2007) - are considered and 
respected optimization problems as well as the solving approach will be established. 
Moreover, in this section, the intractable final equations for finding capacities and 
firm profits which lead me to apply numerical analysis are shown. 
Moreover in last phase of problem solving, we need some specific assumptions in 
order to simplify the sophisticated closed expressions which will appear at second 
stage of our model. Consequently we will impose two more assumptions first on the 
type of distribution function of demand uncertainty and second on symmetric 
consideration of our agents. Symmetric assumption will be relaxed partially later on. 
Note that primarily we solve the model generally without these assumptions in order 
to 1. Justify the usage of recent assumptions and numerical method and 2. Let the 
interested scholar to trace the raw equations and do further probable extensions. 
Assumption TA.3: We assume that demand uncertainty appears in the intercepts of 
the linear inverse demand function which draws from a uniform distribution function
F with density function f as follow: 
1 , 0
( )
0 ,
A M
Mf A
Otherwise

≤ ≤
=


 
Note that M is a finite positive sufficiently large number such that if demand 
realization were on the upper bound of probability distribution, all capacities would be 
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bounded. With this setting in hand, the mean and variance of this specific distribution 
are respectively as follows: 
2
M
µ = , 
22
12
M
σ = . 
Assumption TA.4: We assume that both producers compete within symmetric 
context in which symmetric costs are imposed on them in all different subgames and 
states, that is: 
c c cgi gj g= = , c c csi sj s= = , c c cui uj u= = . 
Moreover they sell their residual general components in second market B  with the 
same price as: 
P P PBi Bj B= = . 
Section TA.1-TA.3 contains the proof of lemma 2-4 which expressed in part 5.1. 
TA.1.The Flexible Subgame 
Assume that both firms invest in flexible technology (modular production process) 
which enables them to manufacture both general and specific components and 
consider the last stage of the game in which both sell their remaining general 
components in the secondary market B . 
The optimal quantity of general component supplied to the second market and the 
respected profit for our firms can be calculated trivially which leads us to:  
For firm i we have: q X qiB gi iA
∗
= − and X q Pi Bigi iAν
∗  
= − ⋅ 
 
. Similarly for firm j : q X qjB gj jA
∗
= − and
X q Pj Bjgj jAν
∗  
= − ⋅ 
 
. 
It means that it is optimal for both firms to sell all their remaining general components 
in the second market with the specific price which is smaller than the unit 
procurement cost of their general component. 
Proceeding backward, at the third stage both firms play a standard Cournot duopoly 
game on the amount of quantity they produce. The optimization problem can be 
formulated using Lagrange multipliers as follows: 
 
69 Three Essays on Strategic Aspects in Oligopoly with Vertical Structure 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )max ,fL q A q q q X q P X qMi ii iA A iA jA iA gi iA Bi si iAqiA
λ λ
 
= − − ⋅ + − ⋅ + − 
   
Solving of this equation for both firms considering the Lagrange multipliers and also 
the slack variables lead us to three different states: First state represents the set of 
demand realizations in which no firm is capacity-constrained (Capacity is NOT 
binding); Second state represents the set of demand realization such that both firms 
are capacity-constrained (Capacity is binding for both producers) and finally in the 
third state one firm is capacity-constrained but the rival is not (Capacity is binding for 
firm i but is not binding for firm j ). As a matter of notation we use is for positive 
integer i showing our different states. 
In each state, the Cournot duopoly game can be solved and the first-order Kuhn-
Tucker conditions are as follows: 
2 0A q q PA iA jA Bi iλ− − − − = ,  
q XiA i siη+ = , (Where iη is the slack variable)  
0i iλ η⋅ =  
Note that we suppose all the quantities are positive and also as the objective 
function is concave, Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions are sufficient as well. 
For firm j we have same formulas with the Lagrange multiplier and the slack variable 
indexed as ,j jλ η . 
State 1: Capacity Is NOT Binding 
In this state we have interior solutions, our Lagrange multipliers are zero and positive 
slack variables exist that is 0i jλ λ= =  and , 0i jη η > . Under these conditions the optimal 
quantity levels are as follows: 
2
3
A P PA Bj Bi
qiA
+ −∗
= , 
2
3
A P PA Bi Bj
q jA
+ −∗
= , 3
A P PA Bi Bj
PA
+ +
= . 
For quantities to be nonnegative we should have two following inequalities: 
2A P PA Bi Bj≥ − , 2A P PA Bj Bi≥ − . 
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Moreover the optimal profit of our firms can be expressed as below: 
( )
2
1/9 2
f
A P P P XMi Bi giA Bi Bjπ
∗  
= − + + 
   
( )
2
1/9 2
f
A P P P XMj Bj gjA Bj Biπ
∗  
= − + + 
   
State 2: Capacity Is Binding for Both Firms 
In this state we have binding solutions, our Lagrange multipliers are positive and 
slack variables equal to zero such that , 0i jλ λ > and 0i jη η= = . Solving for quantities of 
both producers, we have: 
q XiA si
∗
= , q XjA sj
∗
= , P A X XA A si sj= − − . 
Based on our first assumption, quantities are positive in this state. For price to be 
nonnegative (Assumption 2) we should have the following inequality: A X XA si sj≥ + . 
Optimal profit functions of our firms can be formulated as follow: 
( ) ( )
f
A X X X X X PMi A si sj si gi si Biπ
∗
= − − ⋅ + − ⋅  
( ) ( )
f
A X X X X X PMj A si sj sj gj sj Bjπ
∗
= − − ⋅ + − ⋅  
State 3: Capacity Is Binding for Just One Firm  
Without loss of generality we assume that the capacity for our first manufacturer 
(Firm i ) is binding but it is not binding for the second one (Firm j ). In this state we 
have binding solution for the first firm with positive Lagrange multiplier and zero slack 
variable and interior solution for the second one with zero Lagrange multiplier and 
positive slack variable as well that is 0, 0i iλ η> = for firm i and 0, 0j jλ η= > for firm j . Solving 
for quantities, we obtain: 
q XiA si
∗
= , 2
A X PA si Bj
q jA
− −∗
= , 2
A X PA si Bj
PA
− +
= . 
According to our assumptions, for quantities to be positive we should have 
A X PA si Bj≥ + and for price non-negativity we have A X PA si Bj≥ − that is A X PA si Bj≥ ± .  
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Optimal profit functions are also determined as follows: 
2
A X Pf A si Bj X X X PMi si Bigi siπ
− + ∗   = ⋅ + − ⋅     
 
2 2 2
A X P A X P A X Pf A si Bj A si Bj A si BjX PMj Bjgjπ
− + − − − −     ∗
     = ⋅ + − ⋅     
     
 
Proceeding backward, at the second stage both firms make capacity investment 
decisions. In flexible subgame which we consider now, it means that both should 
determine the level of investment on general and specific components based on the 
expectation of profit on the market A  considering the existence of secondary market
B . According to lemma 1, Profit functions of our firms are as follows: 
max
,
fE c X c XMi gi gi si siMiX Xgi si
π
 ∗ Π = − ⋅ − ⋅  
  
Such that 0 X Xsi gi≤ ≤ . 
max
,
fE c X c XMj gj gj sj sjMjX Xgj sj
π
 ∗ Π = − ⋅ − ⋅  
  
Such that 0 X Xsj gj≤ ≤ . 
The optimization problem of our firms can be formulated using Lagrange multipliers 
as follows: 
( )max , ,
,
f fL X X E c X c X X XMi gi gi si si ii gi si gi siMiX Xgi si
λ π λ
   ∗= − ⋅ − ⋅ + −   
     
max , ,
,
f fL X X E c X c X X XMj gj gj sj sj jj gj sj gj sjMjX Xgj sj
λ π λ
    ∗= − ⋅ − ⋅ + −    
      
In each state, the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions are as follows: 
0
f
MiE cgi iX gi
π
λ
∗∂
− + =∂
, 0
f
MiE csi iXsi
π
λ
∗∂
− − =∂ , 
X Xsi i giη+ = , . 0i iη λ = . 
And similarly for firm j we have: 
0
f
Mj
E cgj jX gj
π
λ
∗∂
− + =∂
, 0
f
Mj
E csj jXsj
π
λ
∗∂
− − =∂
, 
X Xsj j gjη+ = , . 0j jη λ = . 
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Since we have assumed P cB g< for any firm which enters the second market B , so we 
do not have any interior solution and , 0i jλ λ ≠ as well as slack variables equal to zero, 
that is X Xs g= for both firms in this subgame. It implies that it is optimal for our firms 
to invest on equal capacity of both general and specific components. 
After some simple calculations for firm i we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 3
c P f A dA P f A dA P f A dAs s sgi i Bi Bi Biλ ∫ ∫ ∫− = + +  
( )* * *( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3f f fc f A dA f A dA f A dAs s ssi i Mi Mi MiXsiλ π π π
∂
+ = + +∫ ∫ ∫∂
 
And for the second flexible firm j we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 3
c P f A dA P f A dA P f A dAs s sgj j Bj Bj Bjλ ∫ ∫ ∫− = + +  
* * *( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3
f f fc f A dA f A dA f A dAs s ssj j Mj Mj MjXsj
λ π π π
∂  
+ = + + ∫ ∫ ∫∂    
In above equations i j g Bc Pλ λ λ= = = −  because Lagrange multipliers here specify 
the difference between the prices of residual general components in salvage market 
and its respective costs. 
Based on the conditions of each state of each subgame we have different lower 
bound and upper bound for our integrals that is:  
For state 1: max 2 ,2LB P P P PBi Bj Bj Bi
 
= − −  
, min 3 2 ,3 2UB X P P X P Psi Bj Bi sj Bi Bj
 
= − + − +  
 
For state 2: max ,3 2 ,2 2LB X X X P P X X P Psi sj si Bj Bi sj si Bi Bj
 
= + − + + − +  
, UB M=  
For state 3: max ,3 2LB X P X P Psi Bj si Bj Bi
 
= + − +  
, 2UB X X Psj si Bj= + +  
Because the boundaries of the integrals are themselves functions of the capacities of 
our two firms, differentiating the first-order conditions does not result in tractable 
equations. Consequently we need to specify some assumptions about the probability 
distribution of random variable and enter numeric analysis. For the sake of simplicity 
we have established assumptions 3 and 4 which mentioned above. 
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Note 1: Whereas lower and upper bound of integrals –as shown above- need a 
starting assumption about the relationship between siX and sjX , so without loss of 
generality we assume that si sjX X≤ .  
Note 2: Since our optimization problems contain maximizing our desired parameters 
including capacities and profits, and whereas we encounter multiple solutions in 
solving best reply functions of two firms, second-order condition applies to screen 
the proper outcomes.   
Note 3: All the above mentioned assumptions and regulations with some notation 
modification apply to other subgames as well. 
After finding optimal capacities, optimal profit can be easily calculated by plugging-in 
these capacities in objective functions of each firm.  
According to all above mentioned assumptions, implementing the first-order 
condition for both firms leads us to the following equations. Optimal capacities could 
be calculated by solving these two-equations-two-unknowns system for two firms 
respectively: 
( ) ( )
2 23 1 1 1
3 29 2
X X PA P A X PX P sj si BB M si Bsi Bc c P P X dA A X X X dA X dAs g B B si si sj si siP X P X X PX M M MB si B sj si Bsi
   + +− − +∂ +    + − = + ⋅ ⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ∫ ∫ ∫   + + +∂       
 
( ) ( )
2 23 1 1
39
1
2 2 2 2si B
X X PA PX P sj si BBsi B P X dA A X X X dAB sj si sj sjP X PM MB si Bc c Ps g B Xsj A X P A X P A X PM si B si B si BX P dAX X P Msj si B
   + +−+   + ⋅ ⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅∫ ∫  + ∂  + − =   ∂  − + − − − −        + ⋅ + − ⋅     ∫      + +          
 
After some calculations, best reply functions of firms will be as follow: 
222 42.250.75
0.25 1.5 0
X X XP X XP si sj sjB si siBc c M P Xs g B siM M M M M
⋅
− − + + − − + − + − =  
22 4 4 22
0
P X X X XP X X B sj si sj sjB si sic c Ps g B M M M M M
⋅
− − + − − + + − =  
Solving these two equations result in intractable messy large outcomes which 
convince us moving to numerical analysis. Actually we reach 4 sets of outcomes, but 
it includes complex answers as well as some outcomes which are minimum optimal 
amounts that should be screened via second-order condition. 
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TA.2.The Inflexible Subgame 
In this subsection suppose that both firms invest in inflexible technology which 
enables them to produce the final product via the unified production process. 
Choosing this technology is a barrier to enter the secondary market B which has 
sufficient demand for general component of the final product. Consequently there will 
be no payoff for our firms in the fourth stage and so we start by analyzing the third 
stage in which they compete in market A on the quantity of the final product (Cournot 
duopoly competition). 
The optimization problem based on our model and by considering the Lagrange 
multiplier can be formulated as follow: 
( ) ( )max ,nL q A q q q X qUi iA ii iA A iA jA Ui iAqiA
λ λ
 
= − − ⋅ + − 
   
Solving of this equation for both firms considering the Lagrange multipliers and also 
the slack variables lead us to three different states as before: First state represents 
the set of demand realizations in which no firm is capacity-constrained (Capacity is 
NOT binding); Second state represents the set of demand realization such that both 
firms are capacity-constrained (Capacity is binding for both producers) and finally in 
the third state one firm is capacity-constrained but the rival is not (Capacity is binding 
for firm i but is not binding for firm j ). 
The first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions for these states are as follows: 
2 0A q qA iA jA iλ− − − = , 
q XiA i Uiη+ = , ( iη Is the slack variable) 
0i iλ η⋅ = . 
We suppose that all the quantities are positive and also as the objective function is 
concave, Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions are sufficient as well. 
For firm j we have same formulas with the Lagrange multiplier and the slack variable 
indexed as ,j jλ η . 
State 1: Capacity Is NOT Binding 
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In this state we have interior solutions, our Lagrange multipliers are zero and positive 
slack variables exist that is 0i jλ λ= =  and , 0i jη η > . Under these conditions the optimal 
quantity levels are as follows: 
3
AAqiA
∗
= , 3
AAq jA
∗
= , 3
AAPA = . 
For quantities and price to be nonnegative we should have following inequality: 
0AA ≥  
The optimal profit of our firms also can be expressed as below: 
2
9
An A
Uiπ
∗
=  
2
9
An A
Ujπ
∗
=  
State 2: Capacity Is Binding for Both Firms 
In this state we have binding solutions, our Lagrange multipliers are positive and 
slack variables equal to zero such that , 0i jλ λ > and 0i jη η= = . Solving for quantities of 
both producers, we have: 
q XiA Ui
∗
= , q XjA Uj
∗
= , P A X XA A Ui Uj= − − . 
Based on our first assumption, quantities are positive in this state. For price to be 
nonnegative (Assumption 2) we should have the following inequality: 
A X XA Ui Uj≥ +  
Optimal profit functions of our firms can be formulated as follow: 
n
A X X XUi UiA Ui Ujπ
∗  
= − − ⋅ 
 
 
n
A X X XUj UjA Ui Ujπ
∗  
= − − ⋅ 
 
 
State 3: Capacity Is Binding for Just One Firm  
Without loss of generality we assume that the capacity for our first manufacturer 
(Firm i ) is binding but it is not binding for the second one (Firm j ). In this state we 
have binding solution for the first firm with positive Lagrange multiplier and zero slack 
variable and interior solution for the second one with zero Lagrange multiplier and 
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positive slack variable as well that is 0, 0i iλ η> = for firm i and 0, 0j jλ η= > for firm j . Solving 
for quantities, we obtain: 
q XiA Ui
∗
= , 2
A XA Uiq jA
−∗
= , 2
A XA UiPA
−
= . 
For quantities and price to be positive we should have A XA Ui≥ . 
Optimal profit functions are also determined as follows: 
2
A Xn A Ui XUi Uiπ
− ∗
= ⋅ 
 
 
2
2
A Xn A Ui
Ujπ
− ∗
=  
   
Proceeding backward, at the second stage both firms make capacity investment 
decisions. In this subsection since our both firms are inflexible, indeed they should 
determine the level of investment on producing the final product which has demand 
only in market A . Profit functions of our firms are as follows: 
( )max nE c XUi Ui ui UiXUi
π
 ∗Π = − ⋅ 
  Such that 0XUi ≥  
( )max nE c XUj Uj uj UjXUj
π
 ∗Π = − ⋅ 
 
Such that 0XUj ≥  
The optimality conditions for both firms in this stage are as follows based on the first-
order condition: 
0UiXUi
∂Π
=∂ , 0
Uj
XUj
∂Π
=∂ . 
That is: 
0
n
UiE cuiXUi
π∗∂
− =∂ , 0
n
Uj
E cujXUj
π∗∂
− =∂
. 
So for our firms we have: 
* * *( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 3
n n nc f A dA f A dA f A dAs s sui Ui Ui UiXUi
π π π
 ∂
 = + +∫ ∫ ∫ ∂  
 
* * *( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 3
n n nc f A dA f A dA f A dAs s suj Uj Uj UjXUj
π π π
 ∂
 = + +∫ ∫ ∫ ∂  
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Based on the conditions of each state of each subgame we have different lower 
bound and upper bound in which our integrals have been defined that is: 
For state1 we have: 0LB = , min 3 ,3UB X XUi Uj
 
=   
 
For state 2 we have: max 3 ,2 ,LB X X X X XUi Uj Ui Ui Uj
 
= + +  
, UB M=  
For state 3 we have: 3LB XUi= , 2UB X XUj Ui= +  
Similarly, according to all above mentioned assumptions, implementing the first-
order condition for both firms leads us to the following equations. Optimal capacities 
could be calculated by solving these two-equations-two-unknowns system for two 
firms respectively: 
( )
2 23 1 1 1
0 3 29 2
X X A XX A uj ui Muiuic dA X dA A X X X dAu ui ui uj uiX X XX M M Mui uj uiui
 + −∂  = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅∫ ∫ ∫ +∂
 
 
( )
22 23 1 1 1
0 3 29 2
X X A XX A uj ui Muiuic dA dA A X X X dAu ui uj ujX X XX M M Mui uj uiuj
 + −∂   = ⋅ + ⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅ ∫ ∫ ∫   +∂   
 
Best reply functions of firms then will be as follow: 
22 21.5
2 02
X X XXM ui uj ujuic X Xu ui ujM M M− + − + − + + =  
22 2 2
2 02 2
X X XXM ui uj ujuic X Xu ui ujM M M− + − + − + + =  
After finding optimal capacities, optimal profit can be easily calculated by plugging in 
these capacities in objective functions of each firm.  
TA.3.The Mixed Subgame 
Without loss of generality, suppose that firm i chooses the flexible technology which 
enables it to produce the final product via the modular process with manufacturing 
both general and specific components while its rival, firm j chooses the inflexible 
technology and unified production process which equips it with commitment device. 
So with this setting firm i has the opportunity to supply its remaining general 
components in the secondary market B with the given price less than the unit 
procurement cost of general component. 
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At the last stage the optimal quantity of general component supplied to the second 
market and the respected profit for the flexible firm can be calculated as before 
which leads us to:  
For firm i we have: q X qiB gi iA
∗
= − and X q Pi Bigi iAν
∗  
= − ⋅ 
 
. But for firm j we have 0jν = . 
It means that it is optimal for the flexible firms to sell all its remaining general 
components in the second market with the specific price.  
Proceeding backward, at the third stage both firms play a standard Cournot duopoly 
game on the amount of quantity they produce.  
The optimization problem for the flexible firm i  can be formulated using Lagrange 
multipliers as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )max ,mL q A q q q X q P X qMi ii iA A iA jA iA gi iA Bi si iAqiA
λ λ
 
= − − ⋅ + − ⋅ + − 
   
And for the inflexible firm j we have: 
max ,
m
L q A q q q X qUj jA jj jA A jA iA Uj jAq jA
λ λ
     
= − − ⋅ + −     
       
Solving of these equations for both firms considering the Lagrange multipliers and 
also the slack variables lead us to three different states: First state represents the set 
of demand realizations in which no firm is capacity-constrained (Capacity is NOT 
binding); Second state represents the set of demand realization such that both firms 
are capacity-constrained (Capacity is binding for both producers) ; In the third state 
the flexible firm is capacity-constrained but its inflexible competitor is not (Capacity is 
binding for flexible firm i but is not binding for inflexible firm j ). This subgame implies 
(F, N) combination which we investigate it here. The reverse case (N, F) in which the 
inflexible firm binds sooner will be skipped in order to avoid similar calculations. 
In each state, the Cournot duopoly game can be solved and the first-order Kuhn-
Tucker conditions are as follows: 
For the flexible firm i we have: 
2 0A q q PA iA jA Bi iλ− − − − = ,  
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q XiA i siη+ = , ( iη Is the slack variable here.) 
0i iλ η⋅ = . 
And for the inflexible firm j we have: 
2 0A q qA jA iA jλ− − − = , 
q XjA j Ujη+ = , ( jη Is the slack variable) 
0j jλ η⋅ = . 
We suppose that all the quantities are positive and also as the objective functions 
are concave, Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions are sufficient as well. 
State 1: Capacity Is NOT Binding 
In this state we have interior solutions, our Lagrange multipliers are zero and positive 
slack variables exist that is 0i jλ λ= =  and , 0i jη η > . Under these conditions the optimal 
quantity levels are as follows: 
2
3
A PA BiqiA
−∗
= , 3
A PA Biq jA
+∗
= , 3
A PA BiPA
+
= . 
For quantities and price to be nonnegative we should have following inequality: 
2A PA Bi≥  
The optimal profit of our firms also can be expressed as below: 
2
3 3
A P A Pm A Bi A Bi P X PMi gi BiBiπ
− +   ∗
= ⋅ − + ⋅   
   
 
2
3
A Pm A Bi
Ujπ
+ ∗
=  
 
 
State 2: Capacity Is Binding for Both Firms 
In this state we have binding solutions, our Lagrange multipliers are positive and 
slack variables equal to zero such that , 0i jλ λ > and 0i jη η= = . Solving for quantities of 
both producers, we have: 
q XiA si
∗
= , q XjA Uj
∗
= , P A X XA A si Uj= − − . 
 
80 Three Essays on Strategic Aspects in Oligopoly with Vertical Structure 
For price to be nonnegative we should have: A X XA si Uj≥ +  
The optimal profits of our firms also are also as follows: 
m
A X X X X X PMi si BiA si Uj gi siπ
∗    
= − − ⋅ + − ⋅   
   
 
m
A X X XUj UjA si Ujπ
∗  
= − − ⋅ 
 
 
State 3: Capacity Is Binding for the Flexible Firm and Not Binding for the 
Inflexible Firm 
We assume that the capacity for our first manufacturer (Firm i ) is binding but it is not 
binding for the second one (Firm j ). In this state we have binding solution for the first 
firm with positive Lagrange multiplier and zero slack variable and interior solution for 
the second one with zero Lagrange multiplier and positive slack variable as well that 
is 0, 0i iλ η> = for firm i and 0, 0j jλ η= > for firm j . Solving for quantities, we obtain: 
q XiA si
∗
= , 2
A XA siq jA
−∗
= , 2
A XA siPA
−
= . 
For quantities and price to be nonnegative we should have following inequality: 
A XA si≥  
The optimal profit of our firms also can be expressed as below: 
2
A Xm A si X X X PMi si Bigi siπ
− ∗  
= ⋅ + − ⋅   
  
 
2
2
A Xm A si
Ujπ
− ∗
=  
 
 
Proceeding backward, at the second stage our firms decide on the level of capacity 
investment. Flexible firm’s decision involves determining the level of investment on 
general and specific components while the inflexible firm makes decision on the level 
of producing the final product via the unified process. Profit functions of our flexible 
and inflexible firms are respectively as follows: 
( )max
,
mE c X c XMi Mi gi gi si siX Xgi si
π
 ∗Π = − ⋅ − ⋅ 
 
Such that 0 X Xsi gi≤ ≤  
( )max mE c XUj Uj uj UjXUj
π
 ∗Π = − ⋅ 
 
Such that 0XUj ≥  
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The optimization problem for the flexible firm i  can be formulated using Lagrange 
multiplier as follows: 
( )max , ,
,
m mL X X E c X c X X XMi gi gi si si ii gi si Mi gi siX Xgi si
λ π λ
   ∗= − ⋅ − ⋅ + −   
     
But for firm j considering first-order condition we have: 0UjXUj
∂Π
=∂  
In each state, the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions for first firm are as follows: 
0
m
MiE cgi iX gi
π
λ
∗∂
− + =∂ , 0
m
MiE csi iXsi
π
λ
∗∂
− − =∂ . 
And for firm j we have: 0
m
Uj
E cuiXUj
π∗∂
− =∂
. 
So for the flexible firm we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 3
c P f A dA P f A dA P f A dAs s sgi i Bi Bi Biλ ∫ ∫ ∫− = + +  
( )* * *( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3m m mc f A dA f A dA f A dAs s ssi i Mi Mi MiXsiλ π π π
∂
+ = + + +∫ ∫ ∫∂
 
And for the inflexible firm we have: 
* * *( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 3
m m mc f A dA f A dA f A dAs s suj Uj Uj UjXUj
π π π
 ∂
 = + +∫ ∫ ∫ ∂  
 
Based on the conditions of each state of each subgame we have different lower 
bound and upper bound in which our integrals have been defined that is: 
For state 1: 2LB PBi= , min 3 2 ,3UB X P X Psi Bi Uj Bi
 
= + −  
 
For state2: 2LB X XUj si= + , UB M=  
For state 3: min 3 2 ,3LB X P X Psi Bi Uj Bi
 
= + −  
, 2UB X XUj si= +  
Hence according to all above mentioned assumptions, implementing the first-order 
condition for both firms leads us to the following equations. Optimal capacities could 
be calculated by solving these two-equations-two-unknowns system for two firms 
respectively: 
( )
23 2 2 1 1 1
2 3 2 23 3 2
B B
B si B si uj
X X A XX P A P A P uj si Msisi Bc c P P X P dA X dA A X X X dAs g B si siP X P X XX M M MB si B uj sisi
 + −∂ +   − +   + − = − + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅  ∫ ∫ ∫     + +∂       
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( )
22 23 2 1 1 1
2 3 2 23 2
B
B
X X A XX P A P uj si Msisi Bc dA dA A X X X dAu si uj ujP X P X XX M M Msi B uj siuj
 + −∂ +  +  = ⋅ + ⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅ ∫ ∫ ∫   + +∂     
 
Best reply functions of firms then will be as follow: 
( ) 2 2 22 2 22 26 9
2 02 2
si uj B B si si ujB si siB si si
g s B si uj
X X P P X X XP X XP X XM
c c P X XM M M M M
− − − +− − ⋅
− − + + − + + + − + + =  
22 2 2
2 02 2
si uj ujsi
u si uj
X X XXM
c X XM M M− + − + − + + =  
Finally after finding optimal capacities, maximum profit can be calculated by plugging 
in these capacities in objective functions of each firm. □ 
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Chapter 3 
 
Supply Chain Configuration under 
Information Sharing 
 
his essay examines the effect of information sharing on supply 
chain configuration where the market characterized by demand 
uncertainty. A dynamic multi-stage game theoretic model with 
incomplete information is employed to capture the sequence of events. 
Our supply chain consists of two suppliers with exogenous wholesale 
prices and two retailers, the incumbent and the entrant, with 
asymmetric demand information. Informed incumbent prefers to 
conceal its private information from the entrant in order to reap more 
profits in the market. The channel of information flows is only through 
the first supplier and the incumbent can supply just from him, but the 
entrant is free to choose its proper supplier considering the point that 
the second supplier is uninformed. Our analytical model demonstrates 
that how the mean demand of the market, wherein our retailers 
compete, and its relation with the relative wholesale price of the 
suppliers play crucial role in equilibrium determination. Our results 
show under which circumstances separation and pooling equilibrium 
T 
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could occur in some range of demand variation. It is also shown that 
the entrant sometimes prefers to avoid information acquisition by 
choosing the second supplier and playing Cournot instead of 
Stackelberg which is more profitable for him in some occasions.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Several industries and businesses follow differentiation strategies in order to attract 
the potential customers and overcome their rivals. Moreover proper implementation 
of this strategy requires a good knowledge of the market and sophistication of 
consumer demand which is costly and time-consuming. Hence access to private 
information about the actual demand of a specific market, particularly today, is a 
competitive advantage in competition that should be managed by CIOs. Controlling 
the channels of information leakage has become an important part of information 
management and business intelligence. Furthermore several competitors work with 
common players in their supply chain which potentially could share their economic 
information with their rivals-intentionally or unintentionally. Zhang and Li (2006) 
mentioned that several managers have concerns about the leakage of crucial 
information from suppliers to their rivals. This prospect leads to control over all 
signals that a competitor might ascribe from our ordinary course of business such as 
quantity ordering to common suppliers. Consequently information imperatives should 
be considered in our profit function and be treated strategically.  
In this chapter we explore the effect of information sharing on supply chain 
configuration in the market characterized with demand uncertainty. Indeed we 
examine how information considerations could affect the operational activities of 
firms. Our dynamic multi-stage supply chain signaling game includes four potential 
players, two suppliers (wholesalers) and two manufacturers (retailers), which will be 
configured based on informational and operational imperatives. At the beginning of 
the game, the first supplier which assumed to be the exclusive supplier of the 
incumbent (first retailer) decides whether to accept the entrant (second retailer) or 
not. Then the incumbent that have private information about market demand, places 
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his quantity order strategically, while is aware of the first supplier’s decision. 
Acceptance of the entrant implies that the incumbent could lose its competitive edge 
(private information). Hence the incumbent has strong incentive to conceal the 
updated information from the first supplier while ordering. At the third stage, the 
entrant chooses its proper supplier. If he chooses the first supplier (and the first 
supplier in stage one accepted him), the incumbent’s order information will reveal to 
him. Finally both retailers compete on the quantity they launch to the market 
(Cournot duopoly competition). Price and profits are determined consequently.  
This research contributes to the available outstanding literature in IO and strategic 
information management by studying the existence of a second supplier (with 
different wholesale price) on determination of the game’s equilibria and further 
supply chain configuration. In fact it investigates analytically the effects of relative 
wholesale prices (of two suppliers) and demand uncertainty’s elements on supply 
chain disposition. We have tried to equip all the agents of the game with crucial 
incentives to have interesting scenarios. Actually we model the incumbent’s incentive 
of information sharing, the first supplier’s incentive of information leakage and also 
the entrant’s incentive for information acquisition and their effects on order quantities 
of retailers and acceptance decision of first supplier which configure the supply 
chain. Four propositions and six Lemmas explicitly depict the results of this research 
which come out of the optimization problems of the game. Results show that how the 
additional second supplier affects the equilibia of the game and under some 
circumstance neutralizes the temptation of information acquisition. The results fill the 
gap of literature in this field. We also discuss about the scenario of exclusive supply 
contract (ESC) between the first supplier and the incumbent. Moreover the paper 
studies the effects of price differences between two suppliers. Several questions 
arise to answer in this study as for which constellations of demand uncertainty and 
wholesalers’ relative price, the entrant chooses informed supplier and for which 
constellations of them, informed wholesaler accepts entrant’s ordering?  Is it possible 
for the incumbent to preclude information leakage? Does the entrant acquire 
information in equilibrium? What is the role of second supplier on the entrant’s 
decision? 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In part 2 we briefly review the 
available related literature in IO and information management. Section 3 explains the 
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basic general model and §4 deals with analysis and results. Finally, section 5 
concludes this essay.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Several papers published in recent years have investigated the effect of information 
management on operation management. Indeed these studies focus on the trade-off 
between C-suits (CIO vs. COO1) of companies, the incentive of “minimum 
information leakage” versus the incentive of “maximum operational profits”. The 
rationale behind these papers including ours is to model the incentives of all active 
agents in supply chain, wherein a company works, and try to optimize this internal 
trade-off considering all external strategic determinants. 
Early papers on information sharing, studied the motivation of oligopolistic firms for 
information sharing. Gal-Or (1985), considering oligopolistic market characterized 
with demand uncertainty, concluded that no information sharing is the unique Nash 
equilibrium of the game. She modeled demand uncertainty with normal distribution 
function. Ziv (1993) designed a mechanism by which the firm will reveal the true 
value of its private information and this truthful revelation is its optimal reply. He 
showed that under some circumstances, information sharing’s benefit is more than 
signaling costs.  
Li (2002) pointed to two effects of vertical information sharing in two-level supply 
chain: direct and indirect effect. They showed that indirect effect (or leakage effect) 
motivates the retailers to conceal the demand information and reveal the cost 
information. Lee and Whang (2000) mentioned several examples of firms in supply 
chain that make profits by information sharing. They also empirically stated that the 
distribution of these benefits among players is asymmetric. Moreover different types 
of shared information were explained in their paper, e.g. inventory, sales, demand 
forecast, order status and production schedule. Our work deals with demand 
information.  
                                                          
1 Chief Information Officer (CIO) vs. Chief Operation Officer (COO) 
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Anand and Goyal (2009) explicitly model firm’s incentives to acquire, share and 
disseminate demand information, and their impact on order quantities and sale. They 
consider one common supplier and two horizontally competing retailers. This 
seminal paper actually is the pillar of strategic information management. They have 
endogenized information acquisition decision of the incumbent retailer (with private 
information) in their model. Moreover their supply chain contains an exclusive 
supplier which our model tries to extend it to two suppliers with different wholesale 
prices. 
Several scholars have contributed to this exquisite paper. Kong et al. (2012) study 
how the potential of revenue sharing contracts, which can be offered by supplier to 
two retailers, can favor information sharing through the supply chain and decline the 
destructive effects of information imperatives on operational one. In fact they have 
investigated the impacts of changing the wholesale price contract of Anand and 
Goyal (2009) to revenue sharing contract. They showed that this alteration motivates 
the supplier not always to leak the private demand information of the incumbent in 
equilibrium. This could result in higher benefits for all players of the supply chain 
even the uninformed entrant. 
Özer et al. (2011) approached information sharing in supply chain considering 
cooperation and trust between different parties. They based their analytical model on 
laboratory findings that firms in supply chain cooperate even in the absence of 
contracts. Partial trust is also permitted in their model contrary to the available 
literatures. Ha et al. (2011) considered two competing supply chains each consists of 
one supplier and one retailer, with production technologies show diseconomies of 
scale. They show that information sharing benefits a supply chain under large 
production diseconomies, less intense competition, and less accurate information. 
For modeling diseconomies of scale they assume to have quadratic production cost. 
Two different types of competition (Bertrand & Cournot) are analyzed in this paper. 
 
3. The Model 
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Inspired by Anand and Goyal (2009), consider a supply chain consisting of two 
retailers and two suppliers in which two retailers compete on the quantity they 
produce in a market characterized by demand uncertainty. One retailer is incumbent 
and due to long presence in the market has access to private information about 
demand. The other retailer is an uninformed entrant that is eager to realize the 
demand information. Based on some long-term contractual imperatives, incumbent 
restricted to supply its product from first supplier, but the entrant endogenously 
decides between two suppliers. Final product supplied from two different suppliers is 
assumed to be perfect substitutable. We index the four players- the incumbent, the 
entrant, the first supplier and the second supplier, by 1 2, , ,i e s s respectively. All firms 
are risk neutral and aim to maximize their own expected profits.  
 
Game Theoretic Model. According to Gibbons (1992) we study a dynamic (multi-
stage) supply chain game of incomplete information between four players. More 
specifically speaking, a signaling game sequentially happens between retailers 
through their quantity ordering from suppliers.  
 
Sequence of Events. The sequence of events is as follows: 1. The first supplier 
decides whether to accept entrant’s potential order -which implies the leakage of 
demand information to it, or not; 2. The incumbent retailer (Stackelberg leader) - due 
to its private information about market demand, places an order with the first 
supplier, knowing that it will leak this information to the entrant (Stackelberg follower) 
if it accepts the entrant. Indeed the incumbent tries to strategically manage its private 
information via its ordering process. This might result in ordering distortion and 
supply chain inefficiency; 3. Then the entrant decides between two suppliers and 
places its order; 4. Here if the entrant chooses the first supplier then the incumbent’s 
order information will be shared with it by 1s , and finally 5. All ordered quantities are 
launched to the market, and price and profits are realized due to duopoly 
competition. (See figure 1) 
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Figure 1: The Sequence of Events 
    The first supplier            Incumbent                 The entrant            Incumbent’s order               
     decides whether             places an              decides between              revealed to the        Duopoly competition; 
        to accept                   order with                two suppliers                entrant if it               price and profits 
        the entrant                 first supplier         and places an order          chooses s1             are determined                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                           
                                       Time 
Demand Structure. We assume an inverse demand function that is linear and 
downward-sloping which implies that it arises from utility-maximizing behavior of 
customers with quadratic additively separable utility function (Singh and Vives 
(1984)). Uncertainty occurs in the intercepts of inverse demand function 
characterized specifically by ( )P Q A Q= −  where i eQ q q= + is the total quantity 
launched to the market by orders of both incumbent ( iq ) and entrant ( eq ). We 
assume a binary support for random variable A that can take two values: a high 
value HA with probability p and a low value LA with probability ( )1 p− such that
0 L HA A< < . We denote the mean demand by (1 )H LpA p Aµ = + − . These priors are 
common knowledge between all players at the beginning of the game. We assume 
that the transactions between suppliers and retailers are governed by wholesale 
price contract. Wholesale price is assumed to be fixed exogenously and indexed by 
1W and 2W for first and second suppliers respectively. Also we assume that both 
suppliers have no capacity constraints to supply the retailers’ orders and also we 
avoid partial ordering between suppliers. Consistent with Anand and Goyal (2009) 
also we consider 1 1( ) / ( )H LA W A Wθ = − − , as a proxy for demand uncertainty as 
showed by the coefficient of variation. Contrary to Anand and Goyal (2009) we do 
not normalize wholesale price to zero and therefore this price appears in the 
formulation of parameterθ . 
 
Extensive Form Representation of the Signaling Game. In this setting the 
incumbent is the sender (informed agent), the entrant is the receiver (uninformed 
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player), type space is { },T High Low= and t T∈ is a specific type of the sender, 
[ )0,im q= ∈ ∞ is the message or signal that sender sends form a set ( )M t , and 
[ )0,ja q= ∈ ∞ is the action or response that receiver chooses from a set ( )A m . (See 
figure 2 and 3) 
Solution Concept. Whereas we employ a dynamic game of incomplete information, 
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria (PBNE) will be derived in terms of information and 
material flows. (Gibbons (1992)) 
 
Figure 2: Extensive Form of Signaling Game 
 
 
Contribution. This model is similar to that of Anand and Goyal (2009) with some 
alteration and extensions: First, another supplier 2s  is also available in the supply 
chain which could affect the decision making process of entrant and first supplier. 
Indeed we have eliminated the monopolistic role of first supplier. Second, following 
this extension, the entrant decision of choosing its proper supplier becomes 
endogenous variable in the model. Third, this setting assumes that incumbent 
receives demand signal, if any, by default, i.e. information acquisition is not a 
decision variable (contrary to Anand and Goyal (2009)) and finally, the decision to 
leak or not leak information is made ex-ante rather than ex-post by first supplier, i.e., 
before the demand signals is obtained (contrary to Anand and Goyal (2009)).  
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Research Questions. This study is going to answer the following questions. For 
which constellations of demand uncertainty about A and wholesalers’ relative price
1 2/W W , entrant chooses informed supplier and for which constellations of them, 
informed wholesaler accepts entrant’s ordering?   
 
Figure 3: Potential Supply Chain Configuration 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
4. Analysis 
 
As depicted in figure 1, the first supplier, the incumbent and the entrant, each, should 
choose among two decisions: the first supplier should decide whether to accept the 
entrant or not (‘Accept’ or ‘Not Accept’), the incumbent’s decision is its ordering 
strategy (‘Separation’ or ‘Pooling’)2, and finally the entrant’s decision is to choose 
among two suppliers (‘First Supplier’ or ‘Second Supplier’). Second supplier here will 
                                                          
2 Pooling strategy implies that both types of the incumbent order the same quantity from the supplier 
to conceal the leakage of demand information. By choosing Separation strategy the high-type 
incumbent and the low-type incumbent order separate amount of quantity based on different level of 
demand realization. Hence the supplier also becomes aware of the updated information. 
Order/ 
Signal 
Order 
Delivery 
Info. 
Leakage/
Delivery 
Tailored 
Order 
Order Delivery 
 
Wholesaler 1 
 
Wholesaler 2 
Retailer 1 
 
Incumbent 
Retailer 2 
 
Entrant 
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enter the game just in two cases: when the first supplier does not accept the entrant 
and so it must procure from the second supplier, or when the first supplier accepts 
the entrant but it is more profitable for it to choose the second supplier. Hence 
potentially we could have 8 different scenarios although some of them are infeasible 
or inefficient which are listed as follow: 
 
Table 1: Potential Equilibria 
 
 Scenario Remark 
1 (Accept, Separation, First Supplier) - 
2 (Accept, Separation, Second Supplier) - 
3 (Accept, Pooling, First Supplier) - 
4 (Accept, Pooling, Second Supplier) Not Optimal for Incumbent 
5 (Not Accept, Separation, First Supplier) Infeasible 
6 (Not Accept, Separation, Second Supplier) - 
7 (Not Accept, Pooling, First Supplier) Infeasible 
8 (Not Accept, Pooling, Second Supplier) Not Optimal for Incumbent 
 
As can be seen in table 1, we have potentially 4 equilibrium candidates which will be 
analytically discovered in next sections. Obviously when the first supplier decides not 
to accept the entrant it is not feasible to have two scenarios regardless of the 
incumbent’s strategy (Scenarios 5 and 7). Moreover when the first supplier does not 
accept the entrant, there is no rational incentive for the incumbent to take the pooling 
strategy as it causes operational distortion while there is no channel for information 
leakage. Thus the 8th scenario is not optimal for the incumbent. Finally when the 
entrant chooses 2s then separation will not be optimal for the incumbent and so the 
4th scenario is ignored. 
Incidentally the relationship between wholesale prices of two suppliers leads to 
clearer potential equilibria. Indeed if 1 2W W≤ then the first supplier offers lower 
wholesale price plus (weakly) higher information to the entrant which make him very 
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attractive in the entrant’s viewpoint. On the other hand if 1 2W W> then the second 
supplier offers lower price to the entrant but cannot add any updated information to 
the prior belief of the entrant while the first supplier is able to do that. In fact in this 
case there is a real trade-off between lower price and more information for the 
entrant which affects the incumbent’s ordering strategy. The following table 
categorizes the remaining 4 scenarios: 
 
Table 2: Potential Equilibria with Wholesale Price Consideration 
 
2.1 If 1 2W W≤  Remark 
1 (Accept, Separation, First Supplier) - 
2 (Accept, Separation, Second Supplier) - 
3 (Accept, Pooling, First Supplier) - 
4 (Not Accept, Separation, Second Supplier) - 
 
2.2 If 1 2W W>  Remark 
1 (Accept, Separation, First Supplier) - 
2 (Accept, Separation, Second Supplier) - 
3 (Accept, Pooling, First Supplier) Not Optimal for Entrant 
4 (Not Accept, Separation, Second Supplier) - 
 
As shown in above mentioned tables, if 1 2W W≤ and the first supplier accepts the 
entrant then the only incentive for the entrant to choose 2s is the higher cost of 
information acquisition. In fact as it will be explained later, there is a threshold that 
affects the decision of the entrant between two suppliers. Here we have 4 equilibrium 
candidates.  
Furthermore as depicted in table 2.2 if 1 2W W> then the only reason for the entrant to 
choose the first supplier is more precise demand information. So in the case of 
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choosing pooling strategy by the incumbent there would be no rational incentive for 
the entrant to work with the first supplier, hence the 3rd scenario goes out. Here we 
have 3 equilibrium candidates.  
For the sake of simplicity and tractability we impose two assumptions as below: 
Assumption 1: If the first supplier accepts the entrant, it will leak the updated 
information. 
Assumption 2: Wholesale prices are sufficiently high as both retailers (The 
incumbent and the entrant) will tend to sell all the received intermediate goods. This 
means that assembly costs of the retailers are low enough compared to 1W , 2W . 
In the next section we consider the first supplier’s decision as given in order to have 
a benchmark analysis in hand. For this purpose we assume that based on long term 
business relationship between the first supplier and the incumbent, there is 
exclusivity in contractual terms such that the first supplier commits not to leak the 
updated information to the entrant. Thus the first event in the game is solved 
beforehand. Details are as follow. 
 
4.1. Exclusive Supply Contract  
As benchmark analysis, we consider the existence of exclusive supply contract 
(Anand and Goyal (2009)). In this case the first supplier is precluded from 
information leakage to entrant based on some fixed contractual terms. That is the 
supplier makes an ex ante credible commitment not to leak the incumbent’s order 
quantity to the entrant. Hence the incumbent, aware of this term, takes the 
separation strategy and has no concern upon truthful ordering. Moreover the entrant 
must procure its order from second supplier. Indeed the game between the 
incumbent and the entrant is a static simultaneous-move game with incomplete 
information in which the incumbent sends its order to first supplier and the entrant to 
the second one (See figure 4). The point is that the incumbent at the ordering time 
knows the exact realization of demand while the entrant orders just based on his 
prior belief. Solving this game leads us to following results. 
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Figure 4: Supply Chain Configuration with Exclusivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 1: Under exclusive supply contract between the first supplier and the 
incumbent (Non-Leakage), if ( )2 13 2 2LA W W µ+ − ≥ , then the order quantities of the 
high-type incumbent, the low-type incumbent and the entrant respectively are, 
( )1 1 1 22 12 6 3
ESCq A W WiH H µ= − + −  ,  ( )
1 1 1 22 12 6 3
ESCq A W WiL L µ= − + −  ,  ( )
1 2 2 13
ESCq W We µ= − + . 
Moreover suppliers and retailers earn the following expected profits:  
( )
1 1 2 1
1 2 .
3
ESC
s W W Wπ µ= − +  
  (First Supplier) 
( )
2 2 1 2
1 2 .
3
ESC
s W W Wπ µ= − +    (Second Supplier) 
( )
2
2 1
1 1 1 2
2 6 3
ESC
iH HA W Wµ
 Π = − + −  
    (High type incumbent) 
( )
2
2 1
1 1 1 2
2 6 3
ESC
iL LA W Wµ
 Π = − + −  
    (Low type incumbent) 
( )
2
2 1
1 2
3
ESC
e W Wµ
 Π = − +  
                (Entrant) 
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Proof: When due to contractual terms, the first supplier commits ex ante not to leak 
the updated demand information from incumbent to entrant, optimal order quantities 
results from solving a simultaneous-move game with incomplete information. Profit 
functions of high-type incumbent, low-type incumbent and entrant which should be 
maximized are as follows: 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1
2
max
max
max . 1 .
iH
iL
e
iH H iH e iH iH
q
iL L iL e iL iL
q
e H iH e e L iL e e e
q
A q q q W q
A q q q W q
p A q q q p A q q q W q
Π = − − −
Π = − − −
Π = − − + − − − −
 
Optimal order quantities are simply the answers of the first order conditions. 
Moreover 0ESCiLq ≥ is the participation constraint which guarantees the entry of 
incumbent and entrant to the market which results in ( )2 13 2 2LA W W µ+ − ≥  . This 
inequality also covers the price non-negativity condition that is ( )1 23 2LA W W µ+ + ≥ . 
Suppliers’ profits can be calculated easily with equations
( )( )
1 1
. 1ESC ESC ESCs iH iLW pq p qπ = + − and 2 2.
ESC ESC
s eW qπ = . Retailers’ profits also have been 
obtained by plugging optimal quantities into profit functions as shown above.   □ 
 
Here the sequence of events is such that the first supplier based on exclusive 
contract with the incumbent does not accept the entrant’s order which is common 
knowledge between all players. Due to that commitment, the incumbent truthfully 
reveals its order based on its updated demand information and so there is no 
operational distortion. The entrant afterwards has no other choice rather than doing 
business with second supplier. Finally after order delivery from suppliers, both 
retailers enter the market and compete on the amount of output. According to the 
first proposition, incumbent’s order quantity depends on the actual realization of 
demand, posterior belief, which is known to it at ordering time while the entrant 
should maximize its expected profit and demand mean reveals in its optimal order 
quantity. In fact the entrant’s ordering decision is based on his prior belief (demand 
mean). Here with the assumption of exclusivity, the incumbent does not encounter 
 
97 Three Essays on Strategic Aspects in Oligopoly with Vertical Structure 
any informational distortion such that separation strategy and maximizing operational 
profit are in its interest.    
 
4.2. Effect of Price Differences  
Here we consider two different cases with respect to wholesale prices of the 
suppliers, establish the (dis)incentives of the players and seeking the equilibrium of 
the whole game. 
 
4.2.1. The First Supplier Offers Lower Price ( )1 2W W≤  
Under this price setting the entrant’s incentives in choosing 1s are lower wholesale 
price plus (weakly) higher information. Indeed even if the incumbent chooses pooling 
strategy, then the entrant can supply its goods with lower cost and its prior beliefs if it 
is accepted by 1s . Actually there could be potentially two incentives for the entrant to 
choose the second supplier: First reason in working with 2s could be the non-
acceptance of 1s and second one refers to the cost of information acquisition. As we 
will show in second proposition, under some circumstances it is more profitable for 
the entrant not to choose the first supplier and enter the market with its prior belief. In 
this case it can produce Cournot quantity instead of Stackelberg one.   
On the other hand the first supplier’s incentive is to deliver higher volume of 
intermediate goods to the retailers in order to maximize its profit. Hence acceptance 
of the entrant is in his interest. Moreover the incumbent’s incentive in both demand 
states is to persuade the entrant that the demand is low to reach more profit in the 
market. Pooling strategy is an equipment of the incumbent to threat the 1s not to 
accept the entrant. The question here is that how credible this threat is. Actually if 
the incumbent pools (the worst scenario for 1s in this case), then how the sum of the 
orders of both retailers in comparison with the scenario of non-acceptance of the 
entrant by 1s  will be. The other point is that when demand variation is high, pooling 
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strategy is too costly for the high-type incumebnt. In fact if 1s knows that the 
incumbent separates then he will always accept the entrant. As can be seen in 
following propositions and lemmas, the relative amount of the suppliers’ wholesale 
price ( )1 2/W W and mean demand µ play crucial roles here which could convince 1s not 
to accept the entrant or could affect the entrant’s decision in choosing among two 
suppliers and information acquisition.  
 
4.2.1.1. Separating Equilibrium 
Here we consider a potential equilibrium where the incumbent’s order quantity 
depends on the demand states (High or Low). Thus if the first supplier accepts the 
entrant then the entrant will have perfect demand information as well prior to his 
ordering decision.3 Hence under this scenario a Stackelberg sequential move game 
with complete information occurs in which the incumbent is the leader and the 
entrant is the follower. 
 For future references we establish the following lemma that states the optimal 
quantities of Stackelberg game for our mentioned inverse demand system. For 
brevity, the proof has been skipped.4  
Lemma 1: If the first supplier 1s  accepts the entrant, the incumbent separates and 
the entrant chooses the first supplier 1s , then the SPNE outcomes (quantities and 
profits) of the respected Stackelberg game with complete information are as follows: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* *
1 1
2 2* *
1 1
2 ; 4
8 ; 16
Stackelberg Stackelberg
i e
Stackelberg Stackelberg
i e
q A W q A W
A W A Wπ π
= − = −
= − = −
 
 
 
                                                          
3 If the first supplier accepts the entrant then the entrant will access to the actual demand information 
and also cheaper goods. Since the incumbent orders first, so the entrant plays the role of the follower. 
4  The idea of putting this Lemma here is inspired by Anand and Goyal (2009). The detailed proof can 
be found in the technical appendix of Anand and Goyal (2009) and also several game theoretic 
books, i.e. Gibbons (1992). 
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Referring to figure 3, the supply chain configuration due to this scenario (Accept, 
Separation, First Supplier) can be depicted as the following figure. 
Figure 5: Supply Chain Configuration of Lemma 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As explained earlier in the separating equilibrium, the entrant has perfect demand 
information and realizes the demand state correctly. Consequently based on the 
figure 2, in the extensive form of the resulted game the entrant infers the realized 
demand, updates its prior belief and knows on which node of the signaling game 
stands.   
In order to find the equilibrium, firstly we investigate the choice of entrant among two 
suppliers. Considering incentives, it is obvious that the entrant will choose more 
profitable supplier. Next Lemma describes the entrant’s decision. 
Lemma 2: Under separation equilibrium and when 1 2W W≤ , if 2 18 7W Wµ ≤ − then the 
entrant chooses the first supplier 1s . Otherwise it chooses the second supplier 2s . 
Proof: The entrant will choose 1s if and only if 1 2s se eΠ ≥ Π , otherwise it chooses the 
second supplier. As a matter of notation, 1seΠ implies the entrant’s profit by choosing 
the first supplier. If the entrant chooses the second supplier, regardless of the reason 
(Its own decision or non-acceptance of 1s ), then its profit- based on proposition 1- is: 
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( ) ( )2
21 2 2 13
s
eE W Wµ
 Π = − +  
 
For calculating the expected 1seΠ , the entrant faces the following maximization 
problem based on its prior belief: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 * *1 1.max . 1 .max .
eH eL
s
e H iH eH eH eH L iL eL eL eLq q
E p A q q q W q p A q q q W q   Π = − − − + − − − −     
In order to solve the above optimization problem we need the optimal amount of the 
incumbent’s quantity in both demand state. The expected profit of the entrant by 
choosing the first supplier is: 
( ) ( )1
2
1
1
4
s
eE Wµ
 Π = −  
 
Solving inequality 1 2s se eΠ ≥ Π  leads us to the below result: 
2 18 7W Wµ ≤ − .   □ 
Lemma 3: The first supplier always accepts the entrant, if separation equilibrium 
outcome occurs after acceptance. 
Proof: Comparing the fist supplier’s profit in two cases (acceptance and non-
acceptance) concludes the result. We have: 
If the first supplier accepts the entrant, its profit is as follow:  
( ) ( ) ( )
1
* * * *
1 1 1 1. . . 1 . . .
accept
s iH eH iL eLp W q W q p W q W qπ = + + − +  
But in the case of non-acceptance we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
* *
1 1. . 1 . .
not accept
s iH iLp W q p W qπ
− = + −  
It is trivial to show that
1 1
accept not accept
s sπ π
−≥ .   □ 
According to above mentioned Lemmas, now, we are well equipped to establish the 
second proposition which describes the separation equilibrium. Before that, as in 
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Anand and Goyal (2009), we should consider the entrant’s belief as a part of PBNE. 
The entrant’s belief structure is as follow: 
( )
*
*
1,
Pr
0,
i iL
e H
i iL
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
A A
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
 >= = 
≤
  
In separation strategy, the major incentive of the incumbent is to signal the entrant 
that the demand state is low. This could be beneficial when the difference between 
high and low demand states is small enough (this term is quantified via parameter
( ) ( )1 1/H LA W A Wθ = − − ). Actually the incumbent tries to manage the entrant’s belief. 
On the other hand, the entrant’s belief is increasing in the order quantity of 
incumbent. This issue will appear as an incentive compatibility constraint in our 
optimization problem such that the high-type incumbent has an incentive to mimic 
the low-type. The inverse one is not reasonable. The following proposition 
characterizes the separation equilibrium. Here, capacities have been chosen by 
retailers, but quantities still not. 
Proposition 2: A separating Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium exists and is as 
follow: 
i. If 2 18 7W Wµ ≤ − : 
 The first supplier 1s accepts the entrant. 
 The incumbent orders: 
( )* 1 / 2iH Hq A W= −  , if demand is high 
( )* 1 / 2iL Lq A W= −   , if demand is low and 3θ ≥  
( )( ) ( )1 1* 2 3 2
2
H L H L H L H L
iL
A A W A A A A W A A
q
− − − − − − +
=  , if demand is low and 3θ <  
 The entrant chooses the first supplier 1s and orders: 
( )* 1 / 4eH Hq A W= −   , if ( )Pr 1e HA A= =  
( )* 1 / 4eL Lq A W= −    , if ( )Pr 0e HA A= = and 3θ ≥  
( )( ) ( )1 1* 3 2 3 2
4
L H H L H L H L
eL
A A W A A A A W A A
q
− − + − − − +
=  if ( )Pr 0e HA A= = & 3θ <  
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Consistent with its belief that: 
 
( )
*
*
1,
Pr
0,
i iL
e H
i iL
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
A A
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
 >= = 
≤
  
 
ii. If 2 18 7W Wµ > − : 
 The first supplier 1s accepts the entrant. 
 The incumbent orders: 
( )* 2 1
1 1 1 2
2 6 3iH H
q A W Wµ= − + −   , if demand is high 
( )* 2 1
1 1 1 2
2 6 3iL L
q A W Wµ= − + −    , if demand is low 
 The entrant chooses the second supplier 2s and orders: 
( )* 2 12 / 3eq W Wµ= − + , consistent with its belief that ( )Pre HA A p= =  
 
Proof: We use Lemmas 1-3 in our calculation. The proof is similar to that of Anand 
and Goyal (2009), adjusted to our model with two suppliers. 
Part One: Based on Lemma 2 we know that under which circumstances the entrant 
will choose among two suppliers. So if 2 18 7W Wµ ≤ − the entrant chooses the first 
supplier 1s . Also in Lemma 3 we have shown that the first supplier always accepts 
the entrant. Hence under separation strategy, the incumbent determines its order 
quantity by simultaneously solving the following maximization problem: 
The low-type incumbent solves: 
     ( )( )* 1max .
iL
iL L iL eL iL iL iLq
A q q q q W qΠ = − − −  
       Such that  ( )( ) ( )2* 1 1. / 8H iL eL iL iL iL HA q q q q W q A W− − − ≤ −  
And the high-type incumbent solves: 
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     ( )( )* 1max .
iH
iH H iH eH iH iH iHq
A q q q q W qΠ = − − −   (Unconstrained) 
Note: The low-type incumbent has not any incentive to mimic the high-type one, 
while the high-type tries to convince the entrant that the demand state is low. Thus 
the maximization problem of the low-type incumbent has a constrained which 
guarantees that off-equilibrium profit is not higher than equilibrium profit. (Incentive 
Compatibility Constraint)  
Moreover the entrant faces the following maximization problem: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
*
1 1
*
1 1
arg max . / 2
arg max . / 2
eL
eH
eL iL L iL eL eL eL L iL
q
eH iH H iH eH eH eH H iH
q
q q A q q q W q A q W
q q A q q q W q A q W
= − − − = − −
= − − − = − −
 
Considering ( ) ( )1 1/H LA W A Wθ = − − , the rest of the proof for part one is similar to 
Anand and Goyal (2009). In our proof the wholesale price appears in calculation and 
change the final order quantity.5 
Part Two: Based on Lemma 2 we know that if 2 18 7W Wµ > − then the entrant chooses 
the second supplier. This choice does not update the prior belief of the entrant. The 
proof of this part is similar to the proof of proposition 1. In this scenario although the 
first suppler accepts the entrant, information acquisition is not valuable for the 
entrant and it prefers to enter the market using its prior belief.   □ 
 
As can be seen in proposition 2, when demand variation is high enough, here 3θ ≥ , 
it is too costly for the incumbent to manipulate its order quantity. Truthful revelation 
of the demand state is in his interest. Thus if the entrant chooses the first supplier, 
the real demand state will be transferred thereafter. Indeed when 3θ ≥ the difference 
between high and low demand realization is as so high such that the high type 
incumbent avoids mimicking the low type. In this case if the entrant procures from 1s
                                                          
5  The proof of the first part is very similar Anand and Goyal (2009, Technical Appendix). Here 
contrary to them, based on different modeling and the existence of second supplier, we consider 
positive wholesale prices which slightly affect the results. 
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then the game will be the Stackelberg with complete information as discussed in 
Lemma 1.  
On the other hand, when demand variation is low enough, here 3θ < , it is valuable 
for the incumbent to manipulate its ordering to convince the entrant upon low 
demand realization. The point is that the entrant is also aware of this thinking and 
behaves strategically. So when demand is high, the high type incumbent orders 
truthfully as before but the low type incumbent should ensure the entrant that 
demand is really low. Hence the incumbent should order a quantity strictly less than
( )* 1 / 2iL Lq A W= −  to convince the entrant that the demand is low. Otherwise the 
entrant might infer ( )* 1 / 2iL Lq A W= −  as an ordering of the high type incumbent 
mimicking low type. Thus when demand state is low and 3θ < , then the low type 
incumbent prefers to order
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )* 1 1 12 3 2 / 2 / 2iL H L H L H L H L Lq A A W A A A A W A A A W = − − − − − − + < −     . 
The other issue is the existence of the threshold which determines the choice of 
entrant among two suppliers. As shown in Lemma 2, the entrant will not choose the 
first supplier if 2 18 7W Wµ > − . This implies that information acquisition for the entrant 
is a strategic decision and entering the market with prior belief could be his best 
reaction. Indeed when 2 18 7W Wµ > −  the entrant produces based on Cournot which is 
higher compared to Stackelberg follower. Also it can sell its product with higher price 
which concludes higher benefit. But the incumbent (as potential Stackelberg leader) 
and the first supplier face the opportunity cost of not having the entrant in their 
desirable supply chain configuration as shown in figure 5. By considering the 
condition 2 18 7W Wµ > − , the first supplier can leverage the choice of entrant by 
decreasing its wholesale price 1W (which we take it exogenous in the model). Indeed 
by decreasing the wholesale price 1W the range of choosing 1s by the entrant expands 
which could be profitable for 1s . 
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4.2.1.2. Pooling Equilibrium 
In this subsection we consider a potential equilibrium where the incumbent chooses 
pooling strategy such that the incumbent’s order quantity is independent of demand 
state. Hence the entrant cannot update his prior belief. Indeed, here, the only reason 
for the entrant in choosing 1s is the lower wholesale price of it in comparison with 2s , 
that is 1 2W W≤ . 
As it was discussed in table 2.1, under pooling equilibrium, the first supplier already 
has accepted the entrant. In fact if 1s does not accept the entrant then there will be no 
incentive for the incumbent to pool. So (Not Accept, Pooling, Second Supplier) will 
not happen in equilibrium as it is not optimal for the incumbent. Moreover as we have 
shown in proposition 2, when the difference between high and low demand 
realization is high enough ( 3θ > ), then it is too costly for the incumbent to pool and 
mimic the other type. Hence pooling equilibrium is feasible for smaller range ofθ
which will be determined precisely later. So the question is that under which 
circumstances the first supplier accepts the entrant when the threat of pooling is 
credible. Following lemma deals with this situation. 
Lemma 4: Under the pooling equilibrium, if 12 LA Wµ ≤ − then the first supplier 1s
accepts the entrant. Otherwise it will reject the entrant. 
Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 3, comparing the fist supplier’s profit in two 
cases (acceptance and non-acceptance) concludes the result. We have: 
If the first supplier accepts the entrant, its profit is as follow: 
( )
1
* *
1 .
accept
s ip epW q qπ = +  
*
ipq and
*
epq can be calculated based on the proof of the next proposition. To be 
mentioned here, we have: 
( )
( )
*
1
*
1
/ 2
3 2 / 4
ip L
ep L
q A W
q A W
µ
µ
= − +
= − −
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By plugging these two quantities into the profit function of the first supplier we reach: 
( )( )
1 1 1
/ 4 2 3accepts LW A Wπ µ= + −   (*) 
But in the case of non-acceptance we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1
* *
1 1. . 1 . .
not accept
s iH iLp W q p W qπ
− = + −  
Separation quantities of the incumbent can be obtained from proposition 2, so here 
we get: 
( )( )
1 1 1
/ 2not accepts W Wπ µ
− = −   (**) 
By comparing (*) and (**) we conclude: 
1 1
accept not accept
s sπ π
−≥  iff 12 LA Wµ ≤ − .     □ 
 
As corollary of above mentioned Lemma it can be stated that the probability of 
accepting the entrant by 1s is decreasing with respect to the probability of high demand 
realization p . (The proof is simply achieved by limit the inequality when p tends to 
zero) 
Now we should find out range of quantity in which the incumbent has incentive to 
pool. As we discussed before, the low type incumbent has no incentive to mimic the 
high type. Hence the optimal quantity of the low type incumbent in pooling 
equilibrium determines the upper bound of (or maximum amount of) the pooling 
interval ( maxiPq ). On the other hand the high type incumbent has reasonable incentive 
to mimic the low type and conceal the real demand state, but the question is that 
‘down to which amount?’ Indeed the high type incumbent pools when it would make 
more profit than the case of ordering a high enough quantity which can reveal his 
type to the entrant. Thus the minimum order quantity that the high type incumbent 
prefers to pool determines the lower bound of (or minimum amount of) the pooling 
interval ( miniPq ). Obviously the lower bound should be smaller or equal to the upper 
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bound of the interval. This trivial condition specifies the range ofθ in which pooling 
equilibrium exists.  
In pooling equilibrium, the belief structure of the entrant which is an essential part of 
the PBNE determination, based on Anand and Goyal (2009), is as follow: 
( )
max
min max
min
1,
, ,
Pr
0,
i iP
iP i iP
e H
i iP
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
p if the first Supplier accepts and q q q or
A A
if the first Supplier does not accept
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
 >

≤ ≤= = 

 <
  
Next Lemma formalizes the above mentioned discussion: 
Lemma 5: A pooling equilibrium, if exists, should belong to the interval min max,iP iPq q  
where: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
max
1
min
1 1
/ 2
/ 2 1/ 2 3 2
iP L
iP H H H H
q A W
q A W A A W A
µ
µ µ µ µ
 = − +

= − + − − − − +
 
Proof: The upper bound of the interval will be determined by the optimal order 
quantity of the low type incumbent because the low type never prefers to pool on a 
quantity more than *LiPq . In fact if he orders more than this optimal quantity, the 
entrant might ascribe it as a high demand realization signal which is not favorable for 
the incumbent. For finding *LiPq we have to solve the following maximization problem: 
( )( )* 1max . .
iP
P
iL L iP eP iP iP iPq
A q q q q W qΠ = − − −  
Since the entrant cannot realize the exact demand state, he should stick to his prior 
and solve the following optimization problem: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1max . . 1 . . .
eP
P
e H iP eP eP L iP eP eP ePq
p A q q q p A q q q W qΠ = − − + − − − −   
First-Order-Conditions lead us to the optimal quantity of the entrant and also low 
type incumbent which specifies the upper bound of the interval in Lemma 5. Both 
optimal quantities are shown below: 
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( ) ( )* 1 / 2eP iP iPq q q Wµ= − −  
( )max * 1 / 2LiP iP Lq q A Wµ= = − +  
Plugging the optimal quantity of the low type incumbent *LiPq into the entrant’s 
equation reach us to: ( )* 13 2 / 4eP Lq A Wµ= − −  
In order to find out the lower bound of the interval we should consider the incentive 
of the high type incumbent who prefers to mimic the low type to affect the entrant’s 
order. Indeed the high type incumbent will pool as long as the profit of pooling 
dominates the profit of truthful revelation. So the high type incumbent solves the 
following inequality: 
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
*
2
1
* *
1 1
/8
. . max . .
iH iP
H
H iP eP iP iP iP H iH eH iH iH iH
q q
A W
A q q q q W q A q q q q W q
>
−
− − − ≥ − − −

 
After some manipulation on the inequality and find out the two roots of the resulted 
formula will get us to the lower bound of the interval as below: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )min 1 1/ 2 1/ 2 3 2iP H H H Hq A W A A W Aµ µ µ µ= − + − − − − +      □ 
Existence condition of a pooling equilibrium is similar to Anand and Goyal (2009) and 
will be got by solving the inequality min maxiP iPq q≤ . The alterations are the positive 
amount of wholesale price- which changes the formulation ofθ such that
( ) ( )1 1/H LA W A Wθ = − − -and also the threshold (Shown in Lemma 2) after which the 
entrant chooses the second supplier. Working with the second supplier leads to 
separation equilibrium. 
Lemma 6: The pooling equilibrium exists if demand uncertainty proxy parameterθ
and mean demandµ obey the following inequalities simultaneously: 
( ) ( )2 23 2 / 1 4p p p pθ ≤ + − + −  where p is the probability of high demand realization; 
 And 
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( ) ( ){ }2 1 1min 8 7 , 2 LW W A Wµ ≤ − − which causes that first, 1s  accepts the entrant and 
second, the entrant chooses the first supplier 1s . 
Otherwise there is no pooling equilibrium and the incumbent prefers to separate its 
ordering.  
Proof: By solving min maxiP iPq q≤ (As done in Anand and Goyal (2009)) we reach the first 
inequality ofθ . The second inequality on µ has been proven in Lemma 2.    □ 
 
The following proposition characterizes the pooling equilibrium when 1 2W W≤ : 
 
Proposition 3:  
• If ( ) ( ){ }2 1 1min 8 7 , 2 LW W A Wµ ≤ − − & when ( ) ( )2 23 2 / 1 4p p p pθ ≤ + − + − , a 
pooling Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium exists and is as follow: 
 
I. The first supplier 1s accepts the entrant. 
II. The incumbent orders: ( )* 1 / 2iP Lq A Wµ= − +  
III. The entrant chooses the first supplier 1s and orders: ( )* 13 2 / 4eP Lq A Wµ= − −  
Consistent with its belief that: 
( )
max
min max
min
1,
, ,
Pr
0,
i iP
iP i iP
e H
i iP
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
p if the first Supplier accepts and q q q or
A A
if the first Supplier does not accept
if the first Supplier accepts and q q
 >

≤ ≤= = 

 <
  
 
where ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )min 1 1/ 2 1/ 2 3 2iP H H H Hq A W A A W Aµ µ µ µ= − + − − − − +  
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• Otherwise, If ( ) ( ){ }2 1 1min 8 7 , 2 LW W A Wµ ≤ − − , ( ) ( )2 23 2 / 1 4p p p pθ ≤ + − + − or 
both does not hold, there is no pooling equilibrium and firms behave as 
proposition 2. 
 
Proof:  Proofs of Lemmas 2, 4, 5 and 6, actually lead us to the outcomes of this 
proposition.    □ 
 
As shown in proposition 3, when the incumbent chooses pooling equilibrium (and it 
exists), the entrant obtains no additional demand information and should stick to its 
prior. The point is that this pooling should be beneficial for the incumbent. This issue 
is determined by the condition onθ . Indeed whenθ is high it is too costly for the high 
type incumbent to mimic the low type and separation will occur.  
The other important point is preconditions for existence of pooling equilibrium. In fact 
information acquisition should be profitable for the entrant which is captured by
2 18 7W Wµ ≤ − . Moreover the first supplier accepts the entrant as long as the profit he 
would make from acceptance (besides the threat of pooling strategy) dominates the 
choice of non-acceptance. This also causes to impose a restriction on mean demand 
that is 12 LA Wµ ≤ − . Hence ( ) ( ){ }2 1 1min 8 7 , 2 LW W A Wµ ≤ − − is the necessary condition 
for existence of any pooling equilibrium. 
 
4.2.2. The Second Supplier Offers Lower Price ( )2 1W W<   
Under this pricing regime, the only incentive of the entrant for choosing 1s  is its 
potential updated information. It implies that if the incumbent pools on its quantity 
ordering, then the entrant will choose the cheaper wholesaler in equilibrium. As we 
have shown in table 2.2, if 1 2W W> we could have potentially three possible equilibria 
where in two cases, the first supplier accepts the entrant and the incumbent 
separates. Hence the exact equilibrium will be determined by the decision choice of 
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the entrant among two wholesalers. Whereas the second supplier offers more 
attractive price, we have a real trade-off for the entrant between higher levels of 
demand information (which could be obtained by choosing 1s ) and lower price of the 
product (which is offered by 2s ). This decision will configure our supply chain. Also 
as we have explained in Lemma 3, under separation, the first supplier 1s  always 
accepts the entrant (in equilibrium). Hence only two equilibrium candidates remain. 
As significant calculations have been done so far, we go directly to state the result. 
Proposition 4: If 2 18 7W Wµ ≤ − and 2
1
0.875 1W
W
≤ ≤ , then in equilibrium, the first supplier
1s accepts the entrant, the incumbent separates and the entrant prefers 1s . The optimal 
quantities of the players and the belief structure of the entrant are as stated in the 
first part of proposition 2. Otherwise if one or both of above mentioned conditions 
does not hold, then in equilibrium, the first supplier 1s  accepts the entrant, the 
incumbent separates and the entrant chooses the second supplier 2s that offers lower 
price. The optimal quantities of the players and the belief structure of the entrant are 
as stated in the second part of proposition 2. 
Proof: The proof is similar to the methods we have followed in Lemmas 1-3 and 
proposition 2. The added condition on the relative amount of wholesale prices stems 
from the fact that 1 2W W> which causes the imposition of inequality 2 10 8 7W Wµ≤ ≤ − . 
In previous subsection as 1 2W W≤ , the mean demand was always positive but here in 
order to have non-negative mean demand we should have 2 10 8 7W W≤ − . This leads 
us to a condition on wholesale prices 2
1
7 0.875 1
8
W
W
= ≤ ≤ .     □ 
 
As expresses in proposition 4, when the entrant has access to a supplier with lower 
price, the range of relative wholesale price 2 1/W W  is more restricted. In fact if the 
price of 2s is much lower than 1s such that the condition ( )2 10.875 /W W≤ would not hold, 
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then the entrant will ignore the updated demand information and work with the 
second supplier. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this essay we presented a model to investigate the strategic effects of information 
sharing on supply chain configuration with vertical structure. We considered a typical 
supply chain containing two suppliers (wholesalers) that could potentially supply 
intermediate (final) goods to two manufacturers (retailers), an incumbent and an 
entrant. The incumbent is assumed to do business only with the first supplier 
(potential channel of information leakage from incumbent to entrant) while the 
entrant is free to choose its supplier strategically. A dynamic multi-stage game of 
incomplete information between these four economic agents was employed: The first 
supplier starts the game by his decision upon (none) acceptance of the entrant 
followed by the quantity order decision of the incumbent, then the entrant decides 
between two suppliers and places his order (considering their wholesale price and 
updated information) and finally, both retailers play a Cournot duopoly game on the 
amount of quantity they launch to the market characterized by demand uncertainty. 
Our model contributed to the literature in IO and strategic information management 
by considering a second supplier which gives a degree of freedom to the entrant in 
choosing its supplier. Methodologically, a signaling game was applied to model the 
strategic interactions of players. Hence, Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) 
has been derived in terms of information and material flows.  
We showed that how the difference between wholesale prices 1 2,W W , the elements 
of mean demand ( ). 1 .H Lp A p Aµ = + − , and also the range of demand variation
( ) ( )1 1/H LA W A Wθ = − − , select an equilibrium from the set of candidates. Moreover it 
was demonstrated that information acquisition is not always desirable for an 
uninformed entrant and how the entrant prefers to trade off between price and 
information, playing Cournot or Stackelberg. Furthermore existence of pooling 
equilibrium for sufficiently small demand variation confirms the significant role of 
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strategic information management whereby the incumbent is able to keep its 
competitive advantage and preclude the leakage of information. Add a second 
supplier to the seminal model of Anand and Goyal (2009), actually empowers us to 
involve the first supplier more actively. This extension gives the entrant an 
opportunity to choose its own supplier endogenously. In addition, the existence of 
pooling equilibrium besides the separation one implies that more accurate demand 
information (in the form of lowerθ ) enables the incumbent to conceal its private 
information while less accuracy leads to truthful ordering and neutralize the 
asymmetric dominancy. 
 Our model dealt with exogenous wholesale prices which restrict the role of 
suppliers. Further research can endogenize the pricing of suppliers in the model. 
Indeed price competition between two suppliers makes the research more interesting 
and realistic. Moreover we imposed a restriction on choice of the incumbent between 
suppliers which can be released in oncoming works. Partial supply also can be 
investigated. Finally for the sake simplicity we avoided to examine the level of 
information quality which is worth examining.  
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